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SUMMARY

This dissertation investigates the role of two federal place-based programs, the
New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) and Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), as
tools for revitalizing distressed communities. The first empirical chapter organizes lowincome, high-poverty metropolitan census tracts into a typology based on their
demographic, class status, built environment, and location characteristics in 2000.
Principal components analysis uncovered three prominent neighborhood dimensions:
class status, urbanization, and black socioeconomic isolation. These dimensions were
entered into a cluster analysis, which identified ten distinct types of poor metropolitan
neighborhoods. NMTC investment, LIHTC investment, and socioeconomic ascent were
highly correlated across neighborhood types. This finding supports an assumption made
in previous studies that developers, who play an important role in determining where
subsidized projects are located, are motivated to seek out areas primed to undergo
socioeconomic ascent. The neighborhood dimension describing the degree of
urbanization was only baseline variable consistently related to both sources of placebased investment and future socioeconomic ascent, suggesting that developer preferences
are informed by observable urbanization-related factors. These findings were then
applied to the development of a model for estimating the effects of place-based
investment on a neighborhood’s socioeconomic trajectory. I use a variation of propensity
score matching allowing for multiple treatment conditions to compare 2000 to 2010
changes in income, poverty, unemployment, and home values between census tracts that
received different combinations of investment through (a) both NMTC and LIHTC, (b)
NMTC alone, (c) LIHTC alone, and (d) neither program. Findings revealed that the
xi

addition of NMTC had a positive impact on socioeconomic trajectories, while adding
LIHTC-subsidized housing into a census tract could have a positive, negligible, or
negative impact, depending on the comparison condition. Overall, this dissertation
contributes to a better understanding of why certain types of poor places may be more
likely to benefit from these types of market-driven place-based initiatives than others, and
introduces a more integrated and nuanced approach for evaluating programs that operate
within shared geographic space to address different facets of neighborhood poverty.

xii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Cities are spatially organized into areas with varying levels of affluence and
poverty. These patterns are important because “the community of which we are a part is
both influenced by and influences our individual strengths and weaknesses (Edelman,
2012).” Places that are home to disproportionate numbers of poor people begin to take on
the characteristic vulnerabilities of their residents, exacerbating the disadvantages faced
by the poor. There are consequences to living in a poor neighborhood even for
individuals and families that are not poor (Coutts & Kawachi, 2006), but deleterious
environmental conditions overwhelmingly affect those with the fewest protective
resources (Galster, 2012; Sampson, 2012). Since 2000, the number of poor communities,
and the number of poor people living in low-quality residential environments has
increased sharply (P. A. Jargowsky, 2013); thus, the harmful effects of spatially
concentrated poverty remain among the foremost social and policy concerns.
As a community- level condition, poverty compounds the cycle of burdens placed
on poor individuals and families (Sampson, 2012). Targeting the mechanisms through
which the residential environment shapes outcomes is an important part of federal
antipoverty strategy, with $82 billion in federal spending dedicated to place-based
programs in 2012 alone (Kneebone & Berube, 2013). While there is broad agreement that
addressing issues of place is critical to improving the life chances of vulnerable
populations, the viability of strategies that specifically target socially and economically
distressed places as an effective, efficient, and equitable means of improving the lives of
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poor people remains a point of debate among academics and experts (Partridge &
Rickman, 2006).
1.1 The Debate over Place-based Policies
Poverty is a complex and multifaceted problem, and its harmful effects work their
way into the lives of people and communities through multiple levels of influence (Sallis
et al., 2006). Policy efforts to address poverty are often designed to intervene at either the
individual/family level or at the community level. Policies that treat the individual/family
dimensions of poverty are often referred to as “people-based”, and those that act at the
community level as “place-based.” People-based policies that transfer benefits directly to
specific individuals or groups include means-tested programs such as the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP; i.e. food stamps), cash assistance, and the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC). Also falling into the people-based silo are housing voucher
programs, such as the Moving to Opportunity program (de Souza Briggs, Popkin, &
Goering, 2010), which address the harmful effects of living in a poor neighborhood by
giving poor families the opportunity to move into places that provide better access to
quality schools, increased employment opportunities, offer more and better local
amenities and services, and are overall less socioeconomically isolating.
In contrast, place-based programs are not designed with the intention of
benefitting specific individuals. Instead, they steer resources into places where high
numbers or percentages of poor people are located (Partridge & Rickman, 2006). There is
an ongoing and unresolved debate regarding the wisdom of place-based strategies.
Prominent criticisms include the argument that targeting places is often more expensive
than targeting people (Deng, 2005); that low-income places are unable to effectively
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harness investments and generate positive externalities (Glaeser & Gottlieb, 2008); that
tying benefits to specific geographic areas induces poor people to remain in place even if
they would be better off moving elsewhere (Kraybill & Kilkenny, 2003) and similarly
distorts the location decisions of businesses (Ladd, 1994); and that place-based
investments are often siphoned off by a variety of unintended beneficiaries, including
investors (Gurley-Calvez, Gilbert, Harper, Marples, & Daly, 2009), landowners, and
higher-skilled commuters and new residents (Crane & Manville, 2008; Glaeser &
Gottlieb, 2008).
While the debate over the relative strengths and weaknesses of people- and placebased approaches is far from settled (Neumark & Simpson, 2014), considerable
theoretical and applied evidence exists to support the notion that intervening at the
community level, if done well, can be part of an effective antipoverty strategy. For
example, the claim that targeting places for investment distorts residential location
decisions (Kraybill & Kilkenny, 2003) assumes a high level of mobility among the
populations living in areas typically targeted by place-based policies (Ladd, 1994). The
large body of spatial mismatch literature (Gobillon, Selod, & Zenou, 2007) suggests a
legitimate use for strategies conducive to local employment growth, particularly in areas
populated by low-income, low-skill, or minority workers (Arnott, 1998), given the
persistence of barriers including commuting costs, housing affordability, and
discrimination.
Place-based policies are also often criticized for wastefulness and inefficiency.
Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008) make the case that the strength of place-targeting strategies
is undercut by the inability of economically disadvantaged places to leverage investments
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into sufficient positive externalities for the surrounding area. A related concern is that the
resources injected into poor communities do little to help current residents, as benefits are
too easily siphoned off by unintended beneficiaries including investors, landowners,
higher-skilled commuters, and new residents (Crane & Manville, 2008; Glaeser &
Gottlieb, 2008; Gurley-Calvez, Gilbert, Harper, Marples, & Daly, 2009). While both
arguments highlight legitimate causes for concern, evidence from a recent evaluation of
the place-based Empowerment Zone (EZ) program suggests that neither is a foregone
outcome. Busso, Gregory, and Kline (2010) found that the benefits generated by EZ
investment into low-income census tracts significantly exceeded costs by raising
productivity in the surrounding area, increasing total employment in targeted tracts and
generating substantial wage increases for residents.
Targeting the places where poor people live has also been characterized as a more
expensive means to an end that could be more efficiently realized by providing resources
directly to needy individuals and families. Yet Richter, Sniderman, Klesta, and Manzo
(2013) challenge the premise of judging place-based programs solely based on costeffectiveness, as the benefits generated are often difficult to quantify in simple dollarsper-unit terms. Along the same lines, Davidson (2009) rejects the strict dichotomy of
person-versus-place that drives the debate, as the experiences of a local population
invariably bleed into facets of place, while upstream social and environmental
mechanisms directly impact people. These final two points suggest the need for a more
nuanced take on the role of place-based policies.
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1.2 Study Overview
Given the overwhelming size and complexity of poverty and its community-level
dimensions, the debate over place-based policies is unlikely to be resolved any time soon
(Teitz & Chapple, 1998). Still, there are numerous opportunities for moving the
discussion forward. This dissertation offers new insights into several underexplored areas
of research on place-based policies by investigating investments made into poor
neighborhoods during the 2000s through two prominent federal programs, the New
Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) and the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC).
A lack of access to the financial resources critical to fostering local development
activity is one of the root causes of persistent neighborhood poverty (Teitz & Chapple,
1998). Both NMTC and LIHTC address this market failure by providing incentives to
investors, businesses, and for-profit and non-profit developers that minimize the risksboth real and perceived- and maximize the potential benefits of investing in
socioeconomically distressed areas. Given this shared purpose, NMTC and LIHTC
incorporate many of the same policy design elements, target closely overlapping subsets
of low-income, high-poverty census tracts, and rely on the participation of similar market
actors to achieve core program goals of increased investment in locations and types of
development that have suffered from chronic underinvestment.
Though similar in terms of policy design, NMTC and LIHTC are notably
different in the types of development activity they support: NMTC is an economic
development program that supports new and expanding businesses, as well as a variety of
non-residential real estate projects in distressed census tracts (CDFI Fund, 2012), while
LIHTC has for the last three decades served as the federal government’s most important
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program for increasing the supply of affordable housing for low-income families (U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2014).
This dissertation represents the first effort to examine NMTC and LIHTC together
within in a single study. This research consists of two empirical chapters focused on the
policy design similarities underlying NMTC and LIHTC, as well as the differences in the
kinds of development activity each program supports. The first empirical chapter
investigates the locational patterns of NMTC and LIHTC investment across different
types of poor neighborhoods. The second chapter examines the effects of NMTC and
LIHTC investment on neighborhood socioeconomic conditions.

1.2.1 NMTC and LIHTC Locational Patterns
Income and poverty levels in the census tract in which a proposed project is
located are the primary factors for determining eligibility for both NMTC and LIHTC.
For NMTC, the requirement is that either the poverty rate must be greater than 20
percent, or median family income (MFI) in the census tract must be less than 80 percent
of MFI in the surrounding metro area or state, whichever is greater (MFI ratio). While
LIHTC can be used in any location, regardless of local socioeconomic conditions,
significantly more generous incentives are available for affordable housing placed into
census tract with greater than 25 percent poverty or an MFI ratio below 60 percent.
The locations of NMTC- and LIHTC-subsidized projects are not selected at
random from the pool of all eligible census tracts. Given their similar policy designs,
similar combinations of factors affect the likelihood that an eligible census tract will be
targeted for NMTC or LIHTC. These factors include federal provisions that encourage
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development in locations meeting various additional requirements beyond the basic
eligibility criteria described above, the decisions of the entities that administer NMTC
and LIHTC in determining which applications for program financing to select, and the
location decisions of the developers, businesses, and nonprofits that use these programs
as a source of financing.
Understanding the treatment selection process is critical for estimating treatment
effects. Unfortunately, several key drivers of NMTC and LIHTC treatment selection are
difficult to observe, complicating efforts to develop quasiexperimental studies that can
offer convincing causal arguments. In particular, the decision-making process of
developers has been identified in previous studies of both NMTC and LIHTC as an
important, yet unobservable, determinant of treatment selection. A primary purpose of the
first empirical chapter is to better understand what differentiates the minority of census
tracts targeted for NMTC and/or LIHTC investment from the majority that meet the
relevant eligibility requirements, but that are not selected as locations for subsidized
development activity.
I begin the study by using principal components analysis (PCA) to condense the
demographic, class status, housing, and location characteristics of low-income, highpoverty metropolitan census tracts in 2000 into a theoretically meaningful set of
neighborhood dimensions. These dimensions are then entered into a cluster analysis to
organize census tracts into a typology of poor metropolitan neighborhoods in 2000.
This neighborhood typology serves as the basis for examining patterns of
socioeconomic change, NMTC investment, and LIHTC investment during the 2000s. In
previous evaluations, it has been assumed that the actors responsible for selecting the
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sites for NMTC- and LIHTC-subsidized projects seek out locations that they expect to
perform strongly in the future (Baum-Snow & Marion, 2009; Freedman, 2012; Harger &
Ross, 2014). Thus, it is predicted that NMTC and LIHTC investment activity during the
2000s was similarly clustered in the types of poor neighborhoods that possessed
combinations of characteristics in 2000 that suggested a strong chance of experiencing
socioeconomic ascent by 2010.
This detailed exploration of NMTC and LIHTC locational patterns offers
important insights into some of the basic assumptions made about these kinds of marketdriven, place-based policies. For one, any neighborhood types where NMTC investment,
LIHTC investment, and future socioeconomic ascent all come into alignment are likely to
be important for understanding the decision-making process of developers. More
specifically, I argue that the neighborhood features that define these neighborhood types
represent a strong approximation of the latent construct of market actor preferences.
1.2.2 NMTC and LIHTC Socioeconomic Effects
The second empirical chapter examines the effects of NMTC and LIHTC
investment on local socioeconomic conditions. As in earlier studies, I focus on changes in
indicators of population and neighborhood well-being in census tracts that received
program treatment. The current study breaks new ground, however, because the overlaps
between NMTC and LIHTC have never been addressed. The first empirical chapter finds
that, as predicted, NMTC and LIHTC resources tend to flow into similar kinds of poor
neighborhoods, given similarities in policy structure, administration, and the marketbased mechanisms employed to steer investment into eligible locations. Considering

8

these results, failing to account for LIHTC activity in an evaluation of NMTC (and vice
versa) raises serious concerns of biased estimates due to omitted variable bias.
This part of the study uses matching techniques to identify suitable comparison
groups for three discrete treatment conditions: NMTC investment only, LIHTC
investment only, or both NMTC and LIHTC investment. In addition to the traditional notreatment counterfactual, I also estimate the differences of receiving two different
treatment conditions.
1.3 Study Organization
Chapter 2 provides an overview of NMTC and LIHTC policy structures, reviews
the extant literature on the socioeconomic effects of NMTC and LIHTC investment in
low-income, high-poverty census tracts, and discusses some of the key issues that have
haunted past investigations. The empirical work is carried out in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
Chapter 5 synthesizes the overall findings, discusses the limitations and policy
implications of this work, and considers future research directions.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction
Until the 1930s, antipoverty efforts that treated poverty as a community- level
condition were mainly led by local governments, religious groups, and civic
organizations (Von Hoffman, 2012). It took the increasing urbanization of the early 20th
century along with the wholesale devastation of the Great Depression for the federal
government to become heavily involved. FDR’s New Deal saw to it that local efforts to
combat the problems of urban poverty received new national attention (Whisenant,
2014); for example, by providing federal funding to support state and local planning
activities (Levy, 2009).

Housing policy is one area in which the federal government was especially active.
Unfortunately, the housing programs that emerged around this time often contributed to
the patterns of social and economic isolation that developed over the course of the 20th
century. Though providing new opportunities for millions and being responsible for
completely reshaping the composition of urban America, these programs were often
explicitly discriminatory. The 1934 Home Owner’s Loan Corporation (HOLC)
revolutionized the housing market by introducing more favorable loan conditions and
opening the possibility of homeownership for the first time to many. Soon after, the
Federal Housing Authority (FHA) and GI Bill made homeownership even easier by
making the federal government the insurer of millions of home loans and offering
attractive interest rates (Greenberg, 1997; Schill & Wachter, 1995). Unfortunately, the
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structure of these programs ensured that these opportunities were not equally available to
all Americans. For example, the FHA would not insure mortgages in poor, racially mixed
neighborhoods. As a result, most FHA activity took place in new, racially segregated
suburban areas (Gotham, 2000). In conjunction the rapidly changing transportation
infrastructure that made the outlying areas surrounding central cities into feasible
locations for industry, commerce and housing, these early housing programs provided the
fuel for a self-reinforcing process of disinvestment, crime, and other social issues mainly
affecting the poor, minority residents of inner city neighborhoods that took hold in the
ensuing decades.

Although the 1960s saw an evolution in the federal approach to urban
revitalization through the introduction of initiatives like the Model Cities Program, as
well as the gains made by the civil rights movement, it was not until the 1970s that policy
changes with significant enforcement mechanisms began to take effect. The 1975 Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) required lenders to report their lending activities at
the census tract level on an annual basis. The result was significantly more
accountability, as lenders are now required to make public records on the loans provided
to individuals in order to ensure that they are meeting their communities’ needs and not
engaging in discriminatory lending practices (FFIEC, 2013). Similarly, the 1977
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) required insured lenders to take steps to ensure that
they are meeting the financing needs of their entire service area, including low- and
moderate-income communities. Lenders are graded based on the degree to which they
satisfy this mandate (Reserve, 2014).
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The decision-making process for many New Deal programs represented a topdown approach that allowed little room for the input of the local people most directly
impacted by the Depression as well as efforts to improve conditions (Von Hoffman,
2012). In the wake of the shift away from top-down community revitalization policies
with few accountability or equity checks came a new group of programs that emphasized
both local control over the decision-making process and remedying the damage caused by
earlier federal policies. One of the earliest and most well-known of these policies is the
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), a product of the Community
Development Act of 1974. CDBGs are given out to municipalities on a formula basis,
and leave communities with more discretion over the use of these funds than did earlier
federal programs. One significant caveat to this is that the majority of CDBG funds are to
be used to benefit low- and moderate-income people (Levy, 2009). NMTC and LIHTC
share much of the substance of CDBG; in particular, an emphasis on harnessing the
wisdom of local markets into the revitalization process.

2.2 The New Markets Tax Credit
While the United States’ history of growth and economic prosperity is the result
of a system that provides broad access to capital (Barr, 2002), many lower-income
communities have been handicapped by a chronic lack of access to the financial
resources critical for creating and supporting economic activity. Inequitable lending
practices from the past that prevented the flow of investment into poor places and
populations have had significant and long-lasting impacts. The goal of NMTC is to
eliminate and compensate for the forces that have left many communities severely
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underinvested by addressing the persistent perception that poor places represent increased
investment and business risk (Abravanel, 2010).

Introduced in the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, NMTC is
administered by the US Department of the Treasury through the Community
Development Financial Institution (CDFI) Fund. The CDFI Fund certifies local financial
institutions, known as Community Development Entities (CDEs), to apply for one or
more of several tax credit and grant programs, including NMTC. CDEs specialize in
providing financial services to traditionally underserved individuals, businesses, and
communities. The primary function of NMTC is to increase the flow of private individual
and corporate investment into distressed communities. Through 13 rounds of allocations,
the CDFI Fund has awarded over $50 billion in tax credit authority to CDEs through
NMTC (Fund, 2017b).

NMTC is a competitive program in which certified CDEs apply to the CDFI Fund
for the authorization to grant tax credits to investors. In exchange for making an equity
investment into a CDE, the investor receives a tax credit valued at 39 percent of the
amount invested. The credit is claimed on the investor’s federal income taxes over the
course of seven years: five percent of the investment amount is credited for each of the
first three years, and six percent is credited the remaining four years. Thus, an investment
of $1 million would yield $50,000 in tax credits per year in years 1-3 and $60,000 per
year in years 4-7. At the end of seven years, the investor receives back the principal
investment plus any accrued interest (Black & Caputo, 2013). Investors often view lowincome locations as high-risk and low-reward. The tax credit helps to overcome this
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perception by offering investors a minimum guaranteed return on their investment. CDEs
use the capital raised from private and corporate investors to offer financing for projects
located in eligible census tracts, typically at more favorable terms than are available
through conventional financing sources (Abravanel et al., 2013; CDFI Fund, 2012). A
visualization of NMTC structure is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. NMTC Structure (IRS, 2010)

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the basic requirements for NMTC eligibility are:


median family income in the census tract less than 80 percent of income in the
greater of the surrounding metropolitan area or state (MFI ratio), or
14



poverty rate greater than 20 percent

While any census tract meeting either the MFI ratio or poverty rate threshold is
eligible for NMTC, the application for NMTC allocation authority indicates that CDEs
are scored more favorably if they commit to making at least 75 percent of investments
into businesses or developments located in areas of “severe distress,” defined as census
tracts with MFI ratio less than 60 percent, poverty rate greater than 30 percent, or
unemployment rate at least 1.5 times the national average. CDEs may also be scored
more favorably if they commit to adhering to two or more other conditions, such as
investing in places that are more distressed than the basic thresholds require, but not
sufficiently so to be designated as “severe distress,” plus into difficult development areas
such as brownfields, FEMA-designated disaster areas, and certain rural areas, or in
projects that are owned by low-income persons, or that will primarily employ or serve
low-income persons (Fund, 2017a).

2.2.1 Current state of NMTC literature
Evidence that NMTC is an effective tool for overcoming traditional biases against
low-income areas is an important benchmark of program success. The perception that
poor communities present increased business and investment risk is not unfounded; yet it
is also recognized that there are opportunities to be found in such places, given
significant unmet market demand (Porter, 1997). The hope is that an initial round of
NMTC-incentivized investment will begin to erode traditional biases against underserved
communities and make private investors more willing to consider the market
opportunities in poor neighborhoods. Limited evidence is beginning to emerge suggest ing
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that NMTC can be an effective catalyst for private investment (Harger & Ross, 2014);
however, others have been critical of NMTC for failing to live up to this goal (Forbes,
2006; Swack, Hangen, & Northrup, 2015).

A related concern is that NMTC may be used by investors to subsidize
investments that would have been made even in the absence of the program. Using an
instrumental variable and propensity score matching approach, Gurley-Calvez, Gilbert,
Harper, Marples, & Daly (2009) examined data from the CDFI Fund and the IRS to
determine the effect of NMTC on individual and corporate investment behavior between
2000 and 2004. The authors found that the introduction of NMTC as an investment
opportunity in 2003 had a significant impact on the behavior of individual investors, as
the differences in investment activity between individual investors and a comparison
group in 2000 was significantly smaller than it was in 2004, by which time there was
opportunity to invest in NMTC. On the other hand, there was no significant difference in
the change between corporate NMTC investors and a comparison group over the same
time period. These mixed findings are attributed to two primary factors. First, individuals
are more likely to use NMTC as an opportunity to invest in distressed communities to
fulfill social or ethical goals. Second, there are already mechanisms in place for inducing
corporate investors to invest in distressed and underserved places.

Evaluations have also focused on the degree to which NMTC-subsidized projects
are relevant to the needs and capacities of the local population. As long as a for-profit or
non-profit entity can demonstrate that a substantial amount of its activity takes place
within an eligible census tract, there are relatively few formal restrictions placed on the
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specific kinds of activities that would disqualify it from being classified as a qualified
active low-income business (QALICB), and thus eligible for NMTC financing (IRS,
2010). Some have argued that this lack of oversight sometimes leads to the use of NMTC
for projects that do little to benefit local residents (Bokath, 2010). However, evaluations
have generally found that in this respect, program provisions have been effective at
decreasing the risk of NMTC being used for projects incompatible with program goals or
local needs. For example, a survey of CDEs found a strong emphasis on supporting
projects likely to benefit lower-income populations, such as manufacturing, education,
and healthcare facilities (NMTCC, 2012). That demand for tax credit allocation authority
by CDEs greatly outstrips the supply of funds further alleviates this concern; high
demand combined with a competitive application process that takes into consideration
potential community impact has the effect of filtering out projects not in the spirit of
NMTC (Abravanel et al., 2013). On the other hand, Brostek (2009) found that between
2005 and 2008, even after controlling for other relevant factors, minority-owned CDEs
were rated lower by the CDFI Fund during the competitive application process and were
less likely to receive tax credit allocation authority.

2.3 The Low Income Housing Tax Credit
LIHTC was introduced in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and has since grown to
become the federal government’s most important mechanism for creating new affordable
rental housing for low-income families (Cummings & DiPasquale, 1999). As of 2012,
LIHTC has helped finance the construction and rehabilitation of over 2.5 million
affordable housing units (Erickson, Galloway, & Cytron, 2012).
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Like NMTC, LIHTC is a federal program housed within the Department of the
Treasury. However, LIHTC is primarily administered at the state level, as funding is
allocated annually by the IRS to each state’s housing credit agency (HCA) on a per-capita
basis. In 1986, the allocation was $1.25 per state resident. This was later increased to
$1.75 per resident, and as of 2003, the allocation adjusts annually to account for inflation
(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2014).

To receive LIHTC financing, a housing developer applies for tax credits to
support a specific development to the HCA of the state in which the development is
located. The developer then sells the tax credits to private investors in exchange for the
purchase of an equity stake in the development. The credit is applied to the investor’s
income tax liability over the next ten years, and the equity investment is used to finance
the completion of the housing development project (Desai, Dharmapala, & Singhal,
2008). Figure 2 provides a visualization of the LIHTC policy structure.
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Figure 2: LIHTC structure (White, 1997)

LIHTC is not a straightforward place-based policy in the same sense as NMTC, as
affordable housing development in any location is eligible for LIHTC, regardless of local
economic conditions. Instead of a strict location-based requirement, LIHTC
developments must be occupied by a minimum number of low-income people.
Specifically, at least 20 percent of renters must earn less than half of the area median
gross income (AMI), or at least 40 percent of renters must earn less than 60 percent of
AMI (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2014).
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In practice, however, LIHTC has clear place-based implications due to a
provision that awards an additional 30 percent in tax credits for affordable housing units
placed into Qualified Census Tracts (QCTs). The designation of a census tract as a QCT
is based on the same two indicators of local economic distress used to determine NMTC
eligibility. However, the thresholds required for QCT status are stricter. To be designated
a QCT, either the MFI ratio must be less than 60 percent (versus 80 percent for NMTC),
or the poverty rate must be greater than 25 percent (versus 20 percent for NMTC).

2.4 NMTC and LIHTC Socioeconomic Effects
When NMTC was first introduced by Congress in 2000, the stated intent for the
new program was that it would “result in the creation of jobs and material improvement
in the lives of residents of low-income communities (IRS, 2010).” Insufficient access to
economic opportunity is widely recognized as one of the root causes of concentrated
poverty (Galster, 2012; Teitz & Chapple, 1998; Wilson, 2011). Thus, the ultimate sign of
NMTC success would come from evidence that the economic development activity it
supports has a meaningful positive impact on the socioeconomic well-being of local
residents.

To date, only one study has specifically examined the effects of NMTC
investment on community conditions. Freedman (2012) used a regression discontinuity
design to compare the differences in socioeconomic trajectories from 2000 to 2010 of
census tracts that were barely eligible for NMTC to those that were barely ineligible, on
the basis of the MFI ratio requirement. Freedman found that census tracts on the eligible
side of the 80 percent threshold experienced significant improvements in poverty rates
and unemployment rates compared to otherwise similar census tracts on the ineligible
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side of the threshold. On the other hand, there were no significant differences in home
value growth, income growth, or housing turnover.

The role of LIHTC as a tool for revitalizing distressed neighborhoods has
received considerably more attention. In particular, the provision of LIHTC that provides
additional tax credits for housing placed into QCTs has been a source of focus, and even
controversy. By providing an additional incentive for developers to create housing
exclusively for poor families into neighborhoods that are already disproportionately poor,
LIHTC on the surface appears to contradict the last thirty years of federal housing policy
by reinforcing existing patterns of concentrated poverty. HUD’s HOPE VI program was
introduced in 1992 for the purpose of deconcentrating poverty through the replacement of
substandard public housing developments, which were typically located in low-income
areas and only housed low-income families, with mixed-income developments (Popkin,
2004). Since then, a number of other federal efforts, such as the Empowerment Zone
program (Forbes, 2006; Oakley & Tsao, 2007), Moving to Opportunity (de Souza Briggs
et al., 2010), and Choice Neighborhoods (Wilson, 2010) have also focused on tackling
the problems of concentrated poverty.

The reality is more complex, however, as LIHTC-subsidized development activity
in low-income areas may generate positive spillovers in the surrounding area and help
foster further revitalization (Ellen, O'Regan, & Voicu, 2009). If an LIHTC-subsidized
development upgrades existing low-quality housing or develops parcels of vacant and
abandoned land, these improvements may outweigh the poverty-concentrating effects of
new low-income housing units (Baum-Snow & Marion, 2009). In addition, the federal
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provisions of LIHTC were updated in 2000 to require states to give preference to housing
projects that are integrated into a larger community revitalization plan. While some states
have taken this requirement seriously, others appear to only pay it lip service in
developing state-level guidelines for allocating LIHTC resources (Johnson, 2014);
nevertheless, this more holistic approach to the siting of LIHTC developments within
low-income areas would appear to ease at least some of the conflict between LIHTC and
the federal government’s current goals in housing and antipoverty policy.

Whether the positive spillovers of new development and the preference for
projects taking place within the context of a community revitalization plan outweigh the
potential for LIHTC to reinforce patterns of concentrated poverty has not been
definitively established in the literature. In a study of the interaction between LIHTC and
the Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program, which allows low-income households to
secure housing in lower-poverty areas by subsidizing their rent in market-rate units,
Williamson, Smith, & Strambi-Kramer (2009) found that HCVs in Florida did not
subsidize rent enough to allow the lowest-income households to find affordable housing
within the private market. As a result, HCVs were disproportionately used by the very
poorest families to secure housing in LIHTC units located in QCTs. Thus, the siting of
LIHTC units in low-income areas may reinforce the tendency for families receiving
housing vouchers to choose locations that are relatively poor (Galvez, 2010), particularly
if poor households use LIHTC to supplement subsidies received through other housing
programs. On the other hand, Horn & O'Regan (2011) found no evidence that LIHTC
locational patterns lead to increased racial segregation, an issue that is intrinsically tied to
patterns of economic isolation (Massey, 1993; Sampson & Wilson, 1995; Wilson, 2012).
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If there is any conclusion to be drawn from the extant literature on LIHTC, it is
that the local socioeconomic context, including the level of economic distress and
preexisting socioeconomic trends, in large part determine whether LIHTC-subsidized
development is likely to have a positive or negative impact on community conditions. In
one of the few national-level studies to date, Baum-Snow and Marion (2009) found that
from 1990 to 2000, the neighborhood effects of LIHTC investment depended on whether
a LIHTC development was placed into a gentrifying, stable, or declining neighborhood.
When placed into “gentrifying” census tracts, in which property values increased from
1980 to 1990, LIHTC developments led to increased household turnover and declines in
income. On the other hand, when placed into stable or declining areas, LIHTC had a
positive impact on property values.

2.5 Research Challenges
2.5.1 Unobserved drivers of site selection
Previous evaluations of NMTC and LIHTC have been plagued by at least two
methodological issues. The first is that the drivers of site selection in NMTC and LIHTC
are not well understood. However, an important takeaway from the extant literature is
that there are different kinds of poor places. Census tracts eligible for NMTC and LIHTC
vary by the severity of socioeconomic distress, recent socioeconomic trajectory, locationboth regionally and within a particular metropolitan area, and in many other ways.
Understanding these differences may hold the key to understanding why some eligible
locations may be more likely targets for place-based investment than others, and for those
places that are targeted, both the degree and direction of socioeconomic change that the
investment is likely to produce.
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Because current federal initiatives address market failures by embracing market
forces, theory and evidence suggest that the locational patterns of place-based investment
are driven in part on the expectations of market actors about the current and future
economic viability of low-income neighborhoods. Therefore, place-based investment
may be disproportionately concentrated in poor places that, at least in the eyes of
developers, are relatively well-positioned to experience socioeconomic ascent.

It is unlikely that NMTC and LIHTC developers are indifferent between potential
project locations. An evaluation of NMTC by Abravanel et al. (2013) found that most of
the businesses that had received program financing owned the property for an approved
project prior to making the decision to apply for NMTC. As taking ownership of a
property typically precedes the decision to apply for NMTC, this finding suggests that the
neighborhoods into which NMTC-subsidized projects are placed must possess certain
advantages that overcome the traditional bias against economically distressed places.
There is also some evidence that the locational patterns of LIHTC activity are influenced
by gravitational forces that favor some neighborhoods over others. Specifically, Eriksen
et al. (2007) found that LIHTC-subsidized housing development tends to be located in
areas where large amounts of unsubsidized housing development activity would be
expected.
Though there is some evidence available to help inform the preference structures
of developers, the specific neighborhood factors that influence site selection have not
been explored in depth for either NMTC or LIHTC. Thus, a limitation noted in previous
studies examining the effects of program treatment on neighborhood socioeconomic
trajectories is the possibility of model misspecification due to unobserved developer
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preferences for certain kinds of poor places (Baum-Snow & Marion, 2009; Ellen et al.,
2009; Freedman, 2012). Concern over this potential source of bias is downplayed by the
argument that if comparison tracts are similar to treated ones on observed baseline
characteristics, then they are most likely similar on unobserved factors as well.
Unfortunately, this assumption is impossible to verify, because there is no direct method
for determining the similarity of observations on variables that are not measured.
Overall, little has been done to examine developers’ locational preferences as
drivers of NMTC or LIHTC site selection. Similarly, little has been done to specify the
structure of the relationship between unobserved determinants of project location and the
observable neighborhood characteristics typically assumed to serve as appropriate
proxies for developer preferences. This is a problem because even a small amount of
model misspecification can lead to biased estimates of program impact, particularly if the
misspecification is tied to particularly influential variables (Ho, Imai, King, & Stuart,
2007).
Previous evaluations of both NMTC (Freedman, 2012) and LIHTC (Baum-Snow
& Marion, 2009) have circumvented this selection issue through the adoption of
regression discontinuity (RD) designs. RD is a promising approach for evaluating
programs like NMTC and LIHTC where eligibility is based on relatively strict and
clearly defined thresholds. Given the extreme unlikelihood of nonrandom sorting of
census tracts around either program’s poverty or income eligibility thresholds, there is a
strong case to be made that the only systematic difference between the groups of census
tracts falling just on either side of an eligibility threshold is eligibility status itself. Thus,
any observed differences in the socioeconomic changes experienced by census tracts that
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were barely eligible for NMTC or LIHTC, and those that were barely ineligible should be
attributable to the effects of program treatment.

The internal validity of a well-designed RD study approaches that of a true
randomized experiment (Trochim & Donnelly, 2001). However, this strength comes at a
price. First, RD only allows for estimating the effects of treatment on the entire group of
eligible census tracts, rather than on those that actually received NMTC or LIHTC
treatment. Second, valid comparisons can only be made between census tracts falling
within a tight band on either side of the eligibility threshold. Consequently, the findings
from a study of NMTC or LIHTC using RD are only generalizable to a small subset of
moderately distressed eligible places, and cannot offer insight into the effects of program
treatment on the much larger number of more severely distressed census tracts.

If the underlying processes that drive NMTC and LIHTC site selection were
better understood, comparison groups that more closely resemble targeted census tracts
on all important pretreatment attributes could be identified. This would generate new
opportunities for investigating the effects of NMTC and LIHTC on community
conditions using quasiexperimental methods that avoid the inherent limitations of RD.
To understand how NMTC and LIHTC site selection occurs, it is necessary to
first understand the nature of the problem these and other place-based programs are
designed to address. Thus, the first empirical chapter of the dissertation begins with a
more fundamental question: what are the different types of low-income, high-poverty
census tracts? Identifying the drivers of differentiation among the places eligible for
NMTC and LIHTC may yield important clues about how site selection occurs through
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these sorts of market-driven initiatives. Both NMTC and LIHTC site selection are
assumed to be a function of multiple neighborhood- level considerations. Are the
neighborhood factors that predict NMTC investment the same as those that predict
LIHTC? Or, are the location decisions for each program made through independent and
unrelated processes?

2.5.2 Implications of NMTC and LIHTC parallels for evaluation
The second problem haunting evaluations of these programs is the potential for
estimates of program impact of one program to be biased by failing to account for the
presence of the other program in the same or similar types of distressed census tracts.
This omitted variable bias issue is closely related to the treatment selection issue
discussed in the previous section, yet to my knowledge it has never been acknowledged
or studied. It is important at this point to reiterate just how similar NMTC and LIHTC are
to one another, in terms of overall policy structure and rules, the actors involved, and the
mechanisms employed through which resources are delivered into low-income, highpoverty census tracts.
First, NMTC and LIHTC define important aspects of program eligibility based on
similar thresholds of income and poverty. However, the basic requirements for NMTC
eligibility are less strict than the corresponding thresholds used to determine whether a
developer is eligible for a more generous level of tax credit through LIHTC; thus, every
census tract that is eligible for NMTC is necessarily eligible for additional tax credits
through LIHTC. There are also additional NMTC provisions that give preference to
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eligible places that meet additional standards of distress. These high distress areas
resemble the LIHTC requirements even more closely than the basic NMTC requirements.
The overlapping tiers of NMTC and LIHTC eligibility would not be of concern
from a causal validity standpoint if the processes that determined NMTC and LIHTC
treatment selection were unrelated. This is unlikely, however, given that previous studies,
which have only looked at NMTC and LIHTC individually, arrive at basically identical
conclusions about the unobserved drivers of site selection. In both programs developers
are assumed to seek out distressed areas that they perceive to be on an upward
socioeconomic trajectory
To summarize, the locational choices available to developers utilizing NMTC and
LIHTC resources are bounded by program rules to closely overlapping sets of lowincome, high-poverty census tracts. Within this shared space, theory and limited
empirical evidence suggests that NMTC and LIHTC development activity gravitates
towards similar kinds of distressed places through unobserved processes related to the
preferences of developers.
The deep parallels linking NMTC and LIHTC are consequential for the
development of valid research designs. The basic goal in a causal study of a program like
NMTC or LIHTC is to draw comparisons between two groups of census tracts that, aside
from one group having received the given program treatment, were identical in all other
meaningful respects. This requirement is violated if the factors that determine a census
tract’s probability of receiving NMTC treatment and LIHTC treatment are highly
correlated.
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While omitted variable bias is a concern whether the omitted variable pushes
estimates of program impact up or down, the unresolved controversy surrounding the
LIHTC provision that incentivizes developers to favor areas that are already
disproportionately poor when considering potential locations for affordable housing
creation adds an interesting layer to the complex relationship between NMTC and
LIHTC. To the degree that LIHTC investment does concentrate poverty and drive the
socioeconomic trajectories of targeted census tracts downwards, there is the distinct
possibility that any evidence pointing to the effectiveness of NMTC as a tool for
revitalizing distressed neighborhoods would be eroded, or even cancelled out, by the
unaccounted- for presence of LIHTC in similar kinds of census tracts. By extension then,
failing to account for the revitalizing effects of NMTC activity in an evaluation focused
on LIHTC could result in an underestimation of the poverty-concentrating effects of
LIHTC.
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CHAPTER 3
NEIGHBORHOOD TYPES AND PLACE-BASED INVESTMENT PATTERNS

3.1 Introduction
This is the first of two empirical chapters in this dissertation. In it I investigate the
ways in which a poor neighborhood’s starting point explains its future socioeconomic
trajectory, its likelihood of being targeted for different kinds of place-based investment,
and the underlying relationship between these processes. As discussed in the previous
chapter, scholars looking at NMTC and LIHTC suggest that, given the market-driven
nature of these programs, development activity gravitates towards areas that are primed
to experience socioeconomic ascent. Unfortunately, the links between the unobserved
drivers of site selection and observable neighborhood characteristics that are plausibly
related have not been thoroughly investigated for either NMTC or LIHTC. The
uncertainty around NMTC and LIHTC treatment selection processes presents a
methodological roadblock that has limited efforts to evaluate these programs.
In general, the idea that developers and similar market actors seek out areas that
they think will improve over time is uncontroversial. On the other hand, one of the
strongest predictors of future poverty is past poverty (Peters, 2009). Thus, most of the
census tracts that are eligible for NMTC or LIHTC investment at a given time will
remain poor going forward. The justification for programs like NMTC and LIHTC,
which restrict eligibility to benefit from public resources to subsets of high- income, lowpoverty census tracts, is that the market has failed to provide such places with adequate
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access to the financial resources needed to support economic growth. How do developers
discern between potential project locations when their options are limited almost entirely
to places that (a) have been chronically ignored by market forces, and (b) are in most
cases unlikely to experience significant ascent?
Though most neighborhoods remain roughly the same over time, some are
revitalized, and still others fall deeper into the vicious cycle of concentrated poverty. For
the poor neighborhoods that do improve, what are the available and most likely pathways
of ascent? From the developer perspective, are some ascending neighborhoods more
attractive locations for place-based investment than others? Similarly, are there subsets of
stable or declining poor neighborhoods that nevertheless appeal to developers for reasons
unrelated to their socioeconomic trajectory?
Finally, NMTC and LIHTC have never been examined together as they are in this
study. Despite this, scholars looking at each program individually have arrived at similar
conclusions about how observed investment patterns are produced. This is no surprise,
given their numerous structural similarities as instruments for delivering resources into
distressed census tracts. On the other hand, NMTC and LIHTC are still distinct programs
that operate independently of one another. Furthermore, they focus on distinct types of
development activity, and it may not be the case that the neighborhood factors most
relevant to the economic and community development goals of NMTC are identical to
the local considerations most important for the siting of affordable housing development
through LIHTC. Are the locational patterns of NMTC investment and LIHTC investment
explained by similar neighborhood-level considerations? Because patterns of investment,
particularly in the context of developer preferences, have not been examined in detail for
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either NMTC or LIHTC, it is difficult to speculate about whether, how, or to what degree
NMTC and LIHTC site selection might be related.
To explore these questions, I develop a typology of distressed metropolitan census
tracts that, given levels of income and poverty in 2000, would have been eligible for
NMTC, and in most cases eligible for additional tax credits through LIHTC, in the
ensuing years. Typologies are an important tools in neighborhood research because they
provide a framework for revealing the underlying structures and key features of complex
urban landscapes. The goal here is to classify distressed census tracts in such a way that
there are plausible theoretical and common-sense explanations for the links between the
initial attributes and subsequent socioeconomic trajectories of each neighborhood type.
These explanations can then serve as a reference point for better understanding the
observed patterns of NMTC investment and LIHTC investment during the 2000s, given
the argument that developers are motivated to seek out the poor neighborhoods most
likely to follow an upward socioeconomic trajectory.
3.2 Developing a Neighborhood Typology
Starting with the pioneering Chicago school sociologists, urban scholars have
been working to understand how cities are structured and how they change from an
ecological perspective since the early 20 th century. Thus, though there is no universal
definition for what defines a neighborhood, there is broad agreement that neighborhoods
are complex entities consisting of an intricately related mix of people, place, interactions,
shared norms, and perceived or physical symbolic elements (Schwirian, 1983).
Furthermore, neighborhoods exist within, and changes to them are largely driven by
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enduring upstream economic, religious, political, cultural, and geographic contexts
(Galea, Freudenberg, & Vlahov, 2006).
Galster (2001) lays these foundational neighborhood elements out in more detail.
He defines neighborhood as “the bundle of spatially based attributes associated with
clusters of residences, sometimes in conjunction with other land uses,” and drawing from
an expansive body of literature, identifies ten types of neighborhood attributes.
Individually, each attribute type shines a light on one part of the larger neighborhood
structure. Combined, they provide a comprehensive overall view of that structure. Once
spatial boundaries are established, a neighborhood can be described in terms of:











The structural characteristics of the buildings
Infrastructure characteristics
Population demographics
Population class status
Public services and amenities associated with the tax base
Environmental characteristics, such as pollution and geographic features
Relative location of the neighborhood/proximity to employment and
commercial areas
The strength and organization of the local political network
Social-interactive characteristics (e.g. social capital, cohesion)
Sentimental characteristics (e.g. place-attachment, residents’ selfidentification with neighborhood, historic buildings)

The composition, quality, and presence of each attribute can vary widely from one
neighborhood to the next. In this multi-dimensional context, every neighborhood is in a
sense unique. However, it would be all but impossible, and potentially unhelpful, to
incorporate elements of all ten neighborhood attributes into a single typology. Depending
on the purpose of the classification, some attributes are more relevant than others for
conceptualizing neighborhoods. For example, housing market typologies are an
increasingly popular tool among policymakers for making strategic investment decisions
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(Boswell, 2011; Goldstein, 2012; Reid, 2011). In many cases, housing market typologies
classify neighborhoods according to features of the built environment alone, and do not
include any indicators describing local populations (Boswell, 2011). In contrast,
typologies that are more descriptive and exploratory in nature, such as several recent
efforts to reveal the full extent of suburban diversity (Hanlon, 2009; Mikelbank, 2004;
Orfield, 2011), take a more comprehensive and holistic tack by incorporating numerous
indicators describing the population, the built environment, infrastructure, and location.
Scholars looking at NMTC and LIHTC have for the most part been vague in
identifying specific neighborhood attributes that developers are likely to pay attention to
when making location decisions. Similarly, there are no a priori claims made in this study
that any specific neighborhood attributes, either individually or in concert, bear particular
relevance to a poor neighborhood’s socioeconomic trajectory. This chapter is motivated
by the general hypothesis that a neighborhood’s socioeconomic trajectory is a function of
its initial attributes, leaving open the possibility that the specific combination of attributes
driving socioeconomic change may vary by neighborhood context. To minimize the risk
of missing any key aspects of neighborhood change, it is therefore important in this study
to conceptualize neighborhoods in as broad and comprehensive a manner as possible.
Obtaining appropriate indicators to represent the types of neighborhood attributes
identified by Galster is an unavoidable limiting factor for developing a comprehensive
neighborhood typology. The availability and quality of relevant data points varies
considerably by city, county, and metro area. However, in national studies, census data is
the only viable source for relevant and universally available neighborhood indicators.
Thus, neighborhoods are most commonly operationalized as census tracts in urban
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research. The tract-level variables available through the census are most closely related to
the following four types of neighborhood attributes: (a) the structural characteristics of
the buildings, and more specifically local housing characteristics; (b) demographic
characteristics of the resident population; (c) class status characteristics of the resident
population; and (d) the relative location of the census tract within the metropolitan area.
3.2.1 Proximity/relative location
The imbalance in living conditions in the city versus the suburbs is a fundamental
source of tension that urban theory has long used to explain the organization of cities and
the outward momentum of urban growth. For example, the invasion-succession
hypothesis (Burgess, 2008) carries with it the implication that residential segregation
along the lines of race, ethnicity, and class is a part of this tension, and is furthermore a
relatively enduring feature of the urban landscape. However, it also assumes that minority
groups, once sufficient economic progress has been made, do have the ability to upgrade
their residential environment by relocating to more desirable areas.
This assumption broke down in the post-WWII years, as residential mobility for
minority groups eroded due to a combination of improving transportation infrastructure,
the corresponding spatial reorganization of employment areas that diminished the
importance of living near the city center, and housing policies and practices that were
often explicitly discriminatory.
In the last few decades, the nature of the relationship between poverty and place
has continued to shift and evolve. Notably, the simple dichotomy of inner city
deprivation and suburban prosperity has come under increased scrutiny. During the
1990s, neighborhoods that experienced socioeconomic ascent were concentrated in the
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inner cities and outermost suburbs of metropolitan areas (Kingsley, 2007). Unfortunately,
the growing challenges facing older, inner-ring suburbs have been overshadowed by both
the prosperity and rapid growth of newer suburban areas and the continuing problems in
much of the inner city, leaving the first suburbs “caught in a policy blindspot (Puentes &
Orfield, 2002).” Since 2000, the dispersion of neighborhood poverty throughout
metropolitan areas has continued (P. A. Jargowsky, 2013).
Several recent typologies have worked to overcome the popular narrative of
suburban stability and homogeneity by revealing the true diversity of suburbs. For
example, Mikelbank applied hierarchical cluster analysis to a set of population,
economic, and government variables (Mikelbank, 2004) on a sample of non-central-city
metropolitan places, which revealed 10 distinct types of suburban cities. He found that
fewer than half of suburban cities were classified into groups that possessed the attributes
traditionally associated with suburbs. Narrowing the focus further, Hanlon discovered
significant variation in the types of inner-ring suburbs in terms of race, class, and
ethnicity (Hanlon, 2009).
3.2.2 Population Demographics
Taken at face value, the concept of neighborhood poverty implies only some
degree of economic segregation. However, it is as much an issue of racial and ethnic
isolation as one of class and economics. Though there is debate as to whether the
persistent inequities in the life chances of minority populations trapped in low-quality
residential environments are driven primarily by economic factors (Wilson, 1978) or are
fundamentally rooted in racism (Massey & Denton, 1993), the importance of
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incorporating aspects of race and ethnicity into a typology focused on neighborhood
poverty would be difficult to understate.

Despite the association of economic and racial segregation as nearly synonymous
issues, there is in reality wide variation in the demographic composition of poor
neighborhoods. Though still disproportionately affecting minority populations, since
2000, the number of poor whites living in high poverty neighborhoods has increased
more than any other group (P. A. Jargowsky, 2013). More generally, in any metropolitan
area there are bound to be pockets of poverty in which different populations are most
prominent. There is likely to be a strong degree of regional variation in the kinds of poor
neighborhoods that exist along the lines of race and ethnicity (Delmelle, 2017).

Recent research on gentrification suggests that the demographic profile of a poor
neighborhood may affect its chances of undergoing socioeconomic ascent. Specifically,
the presence of Asians in a poor neighborhood has been found to be positively associated
with gentrification (Hwang, 2016), while black and Hispanic neighborhoods are more
likely to experience socioeconomic stability or decline (Hwang & Sampson, 2014).

3.2.3 Population Class Status
While almost all neighborhoods have some degree of poverty, determining the
point at which the struggles of poor residents become a feature of the neighborhood itself
is not straightforward. The Census Bureau defines poverty areas as census tracts with
greater than 20 percent poverty ("Poverty Areas," 1995). Though many studies of
neighborhood poverty follow this official definition, others have operationalized
neighborhood poverty at 30 percent (Cortright & Mahmoudi, 2014), while Jargowsky and
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Bane found, after touring neighborhoods with various poverty rates throughout the US,
that a 40 percent threshold may more closely reflect the tipping point beyond which the
concentration effects of poverty become visible neighborhood features (1991). Still
others have proposed multidimensional indices of neighborhood distress that incorporate
indicators of the urban underclass in addition to poverty status (Kasarda, 1993; Ricketts
& Sawhill, 1988).

The various thresholds chosen in past studies illustrate that there are gradients of
neighborhood poverty and distress. Though some scholars have focused on neighborhood
poverty within a relatively narrow range, more often, all places that meet some minimum
requirement are included in the analysis. This approach is bound to cast a wide net,
capturing places contending with vastly different levels of deprivation. The class-related
characteristics of the resident population have implications for a neighborhood’s
socioeconomic trajectory. For example, the process of externally-driven gentrification is
a rare occurrence in deeply impoverished neighborhoods (Clay, 1979; Helms, 2003).
Similarly, ascent through incumbent upgrading is most likely in relatively stable,
moderate-income areas (Clay, 1979; Owens, 2012; Van Criekingen & Decroly, 2003).
Local income levels also relate to the organizational capacity of the local population in
terms of the ability to effectively communicate local needs to government leaders and
other decision-makers (Jun & Musso, 2013).

3.2.4 Housing Characteristics
The qualities of the local housing stock can reveal much about a neighborhood,
including its function within the metropolitan ecosystem, its needs and assets, its
residential population, and its propensity to experience different trajectories of
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socioeconomic change. For instance, the type of housing that predominates- single family
homes versus townhomes, apartments, and other multi-unit structures, provides a rough
indicator of where a neighborhood lies along the urban-rural continuum. Owner-occupied
housing relates to neighborhood stability, as residential turnover is generally less frequent
for homeowners versus renters (Coulton, 2014). It may also lend insight into the physical
condition of the housing stock, as owner-occupied housing tends to receive more regular
and substantive upkeep than rental housing (Rohe & Stewart, 1996).
In many cities, local housing market conditions may also play a part in
determining the kinds of policy interventions that are applied to a poor neighborhood, or
even whether a neighborhood is likely to be targeted for public investment at all. Given
the reality of limited resources available to address often widespread problems, local
governments have in recent years looked to housing market typologies to make strategic
decisions for targeting investments into certain areas (Boswell, 2011). The indicators
selected to represent local housing markets vary from city to city. In some cases,
variables relating to population characteristics are used alongside housing variables,
while other cities focus only on facets of the built environment and household structure
(Baltimore City's 2014 Housing Market Typology, 2015; Goldstein, 2011; Reid, 2011).
3.3 Study Area
The primary study area consists of census tracts that met at least one of the basic
NMTC eligibility requirements in 2000: (a) tract MFI less than 80 percent of metro/state
MFI; or (b) poverty rate above 20 percent. Any census tract that met one of these
requirements but not the other was only included in the study if it was more distressed
than the metropolitan average on the non-qualifying indicator. Thus, a relatively small
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number of “high poverty-high income” and “low poverty-low income” census tracts were
excluded even though they were technically sufficiently poor to qualify for NMTC, and
potentially for additional tax credits through LIHTC as well. They were excluded because
further investigation revealed that these places tended to be poor for reasons that have
little to do with the purpose of programs like NMTC and LIHTC, and in ways that set
them apart from most distressed places. To illustrate, high-poverty census tracts (>20%)
in which the MFI was greater than the MFI of the surrounding metro area were almost
exclusively located in well-known college towns (e.g. Ann Arbor), suggesting areas with
high concentrations of student housing. Though recent research suggests that poverty,
food insecurity, and homelessness are hidden and underreported problems on many
college campuses (Goldrick-Rab, Richardson, & Hernandez, 2017), in general, poverty
for college students is a planned situation with predefined start- and end-dates.
Furthermore, the annual housing churn that occurs as incoming freshmen replace
graduating seniors means that poverty rates in neighborhoods with lots of student housing
are stable and enduring neighborhood features. In other words, the flavor of poverty in
these areas, both at the individual- and neighborhood-level is very different than the
structural disadvantages of socioeconomic isolation found in most poor places.

Census tracts with zero or near zero populations, as well as those that had missing
values for any of the variables needed to construct the outcome measures were also
excluded. Finally, only metropolitan areas that received investment through either NMTC
or LIHTC during the treatment period for this study of 2003-2007 were considered. What
remained after these exclusions were 14,750 census tracts located within 276
metropolitan areas.
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The basic NMTC poverty and income requirements, which are less strict than the
corresponding LIHTC thresholds for receiving more generous tax incentives, served as
the starting point for identifying the study population. The reasoning for taking this
relatively relaxed approach to operationalizing neighborhood poverty was that it would
allow for an investigation of place-based investment across the full spectrum of places
typically targeted by these types of programs, from the moderately distressed to the
extremely impoverished.

However, after working with the data for a time, it became clear that this
definition may have been too broad with respect to properly investigating the role of the
market actors that use NMTC and LIHTC financing, and specifically their presumed
preference for places they believe will experience future socioeconomic ascent, in
shaping NMTC and LIHTC investment patterns. Though every census tract included in
the primary analysis was eligible for NMTC and LIHTC investment during the 2000s,
both programs include provisions favoring census tracts that meet higher criteria of
socioeconomic distress than the basic program eligibility requirements dictate. First, as
just mentioned, LIHTC requirements for additional tax credits are stricter than the basic
NMTC requirements on both the MFI ratio (80 percent for NMTC versus 60 percent for
LIHTC) and poverty rate (20 percent for NMTC versus 25 percent for LIHTC)
thresholds. Thus, Second, CDEs are more likely to be awarded NMTC allocation
authority if they indicate on the program application that at least 75 percent of allocations
will go to projects located in eligible census tracts that meet additional requirements
(MFI ratio of 60 percent; poverty rate above 30 percent; or unemployment 1.5 times the
metropolitan average).
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These provisions effectively divide the study population into multiple tiers of
eligibility or favorability. If a developer wants to locate a subsidized project into a census
tract that is only moderately distressed, they must weigh this preference against the
additional benefits they may be able to receive if they instead select a more severely
distressed area. In contrast, in more severely distressed census tracts for which all
additional rules and provisions have been satisfied, no such competing motivations exist.
Thus, the observed locational patterns of NMTC and LIHTC investment in these areas
may be a more pure reflection of the preference structures of developers for
neighborhoods with certain attributes, rather than other factors affecting site selection.

Thus, I determined that it was important to also investigate the locational patterns
of NMTC and LIHTC investment in a subset of “severely distressed” census tracts in
which there were no obvious drivers of site selection other than the preferences of
developers. For the purpose of this study, a census tract was considered to be severely
distressed if it met both of the following conditions: (a) poverty rate above 25 percent,
and (b) MFI ratio less than 60 percent. All 5,161 census tracts that met both requirements
would have been given the full consideration and benefit of both programs during the
2000s. Descriptive statistics for the primary study population and for the subset of
severely distressed census tracts are provided in Table 1.
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Table 1. Census Tract Characteristics

All tracts (n = 14750)
Year 2000 Attributes (% unless noted)
Poverty Rate
25.86
MFI Ratio (tract/metro income)
59.57
Unemployment
10.91
White
35.74
Black
31.45
Hispanic
26.66
Asian
4.41
Foreign-born
19.28
High school or less
63.77
Bachelors or more
13.05
Vacancy rate
9.37
Housing owner-occupied
43.85
Pop.density (mi2 )
11567
Density ratio (tract/metro)
165
Housing in multi-unit structure
45.03
tract/metro home prices
66.03
2000 to 2009-2013 SES change (percentage point,
except for median home value change)
poverty.ch
4.47
mfi.ch
-2576
mfi.ratio.ch
-0.75
unemp.ch
4.58
mhmval.ch
$44,023
Investment from 2003-2007
NMTC
$5,873,617,231
LIHTC
$1,293,313,586
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severely distressed tracts (n =
5161)
35.99
44.85
14.92
19.20
45.93
29.56
3.78
19.76
70.46
9.41
11.31
33.53
14928
194
53.31
57.96

2.75
-968
0.89
3.92
$50,128
$3,379,389,616
$734,952,443

3.4 Data
3.4.1 Neighborhood Variables
Variables describing the initial attributes of census tracts came from the 2000
Decennial Census. Variable selection was made with respect to two principal concerns. It
was important to include variables relating to the four neighborhood attributes discussed
earlier- population demographics, population class status, housing characteristics, and
location characteristics- while simultaneously ensuring that the selected variables as a
group met the minimum established guidelines and rules of thumb for the methods
employed to develop the typology. In particular, the success of factor analysis at reducing
a set of observed variables into a smaller number of meaningful and theoretically relevant
combined variables depends on how the included variables are related. In general, the
aim is to strike a balance between uniqueness and multicollinearity. After
experimentation with numerous alternative specifications, the thirteen variables listed in
Table 2 were selected to represent neighborhoods.

Table 2. Variables Used to Identify Neighborhood Dimensions
Variable Name
Demographic
black.pct.00
other.race.pct.00
hh_female_kids.pct.00
Class Status
poverty.pct.00
mfi.ratio.00
unemp.pct.00
female_labor.pct.00
hs.edu.pct.00
Housing

Description
Percent Black
Percent neither non-Hispanic black nor white
Percent Female-headed Households
Poverty Rate (%)
MFI Ratio (tract/metro income)
Unemployment Rate (%)
Percent of Females 16 and Over in Labor Force
Percent of Adults Over 24 with HS Education or Less
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vac.pct.00
multi.pct.00
own.pct.00
mhmval.00
Proximity
density.00.ratio

Percent of Housing Units Vacant
Percent of Housing Units in Multi-unit Structures
Percent of Housing Owner-occupied
Median Home Value
Ratio of density in census tract to metro

Most of the indicators used here have found use in previous neighborhood
typologies and are generally self-explanatory. Still, a couple comments are necessary.
First, the location and proximity characteristics of census tracts are operationalized as the
ratio of population density in the census tract to the surrounding metro area. The census
tracts included in this study come from a wide range of metropolitan contexts in terms of
size and urbanization. This relative measure makes it possible to draw parallels between
census tracts that may bear very little surface resemblance, but that occupy the same
ecological niche within their respective metropolitan settings. This measure may also do
a better job of reflecting proximity characteristics in polycentric urban areas than would a
measure that assumes a single central business district, such as distance from downtown.

Second, the percent of females in the labor force was included as an indicator of
population class status. It was chosen instead of labor force participation for the entire
adult population because from the earliest stages of social area analysis, female labor
force participation has been considered an important aspect of family structure, which is
one of the fundamental dimensions of social organization in neighborhoods (Greer, 1962;
Schwirian, 1983).

Four socioeconomic change indicators were constructed using the 2000 census
data and the 2009-2013 American Community Survey (ACS). The outcomes examined in
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this study are the 2000 to 2009-2013 differences in poverty rate, unemployment rate,
median family income, and median home value. The poverty and unemployment
measures are percentage point changes. Median family income and median home values
measures are inflation-adjusted dollar changes. Together, these four measures provide a
well-rounded picture of the socioeconomic trajectory of a census tract during the 2000s.

3.4.2 Program Variables
NMTC and LIHTC data came from each program’s respective public data release.
The CDFI Fund, which administers NMTC, requires all CDEs that are awarded an
NMTC allocation to submit an annual report describing how the allocation was used
(Fund, 2017b). Although LIHTC is administered by the IRS, data on LIHTC investment
activity is maintained by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2014).

The variables describing NMTC and LIHTC investment most relevant to this
study are allocation year, the census tract in which the investment occurred, and the
dollar amount of the investment. In this chapter, both NMTC investment and LIHTC
investment are defined in simple binary terms: a census tract is considered to have
received NMTC or LIHTC if there was at least one recorded instance of investment from
2003 to 2007. Three treatment variables were created to indicate whether a census tract
received both NMTC and LIHTC, NMTC (irrespective of LIHTC investment, and
LIHTC (irrespective of NMTC).
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3.5 Method
The approach to typology development applied in this study is well-established in
the history of urban research (Shevky & Bell, 1955), and finds continued use today
(Hanlon, 2009; Owens, 2012). It is a two-step process. First, the thirteen neighborhood
attribute variables shown in Table 2 were entered into a principal components analysis
(PCA) to uncover key neighborhood dimensions. Second, cluster analysis was used to
delineate distinct subgroups of census tracts based on similar combinations of values
along those dimensions.

3.5.1 Principal Components Analysis
A commonly used factor extraction technique in exploratory studies (Pett,
Lackey, & Sullivan, 2003), PCA was used to uncover the latent drivers of differentiation
among poor census tracts. PCA converts the correlation matrix of a set of variables into
uncorrelated linear combinations of those variables, referred to as components. The
variables with higher loadings on a component explain more of the variance within that
component. The basic idea behind PCA is that the set of variables that load highly against
a component may each be describing different facets of some common underlying
construct (Field, 2009). In terms of the current study, if the subgroup of observed
neighborhood indicators that are strongly associated with a particular component fit
together in a theoretical sense, then the relationships between these variables may be
pointing towards some unobserved, but meaningful neighborhood dimension.

The R package psych was used to conduct the PCA. The output of the procedure
includes standardized component scores for each census tract on the retained
components. A component score is a weighted average of the variables that make up a
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component; in effect, it is an index of the neighborhood dimension that component
represents. Thus, a census tract’s component scores describe the nature and strength of its
association with the neighborhood dimensions identified by the PCA.

3.5.2 Cluster analysis
Cluster analysis is a computationally intensive procedure, which can be a problem
when the goal is to classify a large number of observations. The benefit of PCA in this
study is that it summarizes thirteen theoretically relevant neighborhood indicators in a
few combined variables. By conducting cluster analysis on these combined variables,
much more information about poor neighborhoods can be taken into consideration for
identifying neighborhood types than would be possible if individual observed variables
were used instead.

The two most common clustering techniques for neighborhood classification in
previous studies are hierarchical clustering and clustering through partitioning (e.g., kmeans). For example, Mikelbank (2004) used a hierarchical approach to classify the types
of suburban places, while Owens (2012) used k-means clustering to examine the various
pathways of socioeconomic ascent for different types of census tracts. Both hierarchical
and k-means clustering have been subject to criticism for their reliance on heuristics to
determine the number and orientation of clusters (Fraley & Raftery, 1998). In this study,
a model-based technique was used that incorporates elements of both methods, but takes
such decisions out of the hands of user. Instead, the data itself is allowed determine the
number and orientation of clusters, as well as the best cluster solution.
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The R package mclust was used to perform the cluster analysis (Fraley & Raftery,
2006). Mclust requires the user to specify a range of possible cluster solutions that should
be considered. Starting with the highest number in the specified range, mclust runs 14
different clustering algorithms, each of which produces clusters with a different
combination of geometric attributes in terms of their shape, volume, and orientation.

The program then calculates the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for each
alternative cluster solution. The BIC is a model selection tool based on the maximumlikelihood function. Given that the best fitting model is, by definition, the one that places
each observation into its own cluster, maximum- likelihood prefers solutions with more
clusters. The BIC applies a penalty term to the likelihood to reduce the risk of selecting
overly-complex cluster solutions. In general, the best cluster solution is the one with the
lowest BIC. In the current study, the 14 clustering algorithms were run for between one
and fifteen clusters. Thus, the procedure generated approximately 210 distinct
neighborhood classifications, from which the one with the lowest BIC could be selected.
The key features and theoretical underpinning of the neighborhood types identified by the
preferred cluster solution were then investigated.

3.5.3 Patterns of investment and SES change by neighborhood type
The study then shifts focus to explore the relationships between NMTC
investment, LIHTC investment, and socioeconomic change within and across
neighborhood types. The measures of NMTC investment, LIHTC investment, and
socioeconomic change described earlier were aggregated for each neighborhood type.
Place-based investment intensity was operationalized through three variables: the percent
of census tracts in each neighborhood type that between 2003 and 2007 received
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investment through (a) NMTC (regardless of LIHTC investment), (b) LIHTC (regardless
of NMTC investment), and (c) both NMTC and LIHTC. Four aggregate measures of
socioeconomic change were calculated as well. These were the average of 2000 to 20092013 change in (a) MFI, (b) poverty rate, (d) unemployment rate, and (e) median home
value.

3.6 Results
3.6.1 Uncovering Neighborhood Dimensions
As mentioned above, the thirteen variables chosen to represent census tracts’
initial attributes were selected with respect to their theoretical relevance as well as their
ability as a group to satisfy the established guidelines for conducting PCA (Field, 2009).
The Kaiser-Meyer Olkin test verified the sampling adequacy of the data, with a value of
.74, indicating the suitability of the data as ‘good’ for conducting PCA. Furthermore, the
minimum KMO value for any of the variables was .64, well above the minimum
suggested value of .5. Bartlett’s test of sphericity found that there was sufficient
correlation between all variables to conduct a PCA, while the determinant of the
correlation matrix, at .00067, was well above the minimum value of .000001, ruling out
concern over multicollinearity.

A common rule of thumb is to retain all components with eigenvalues greater than
one, as they have at least as much explanatory power as one of the observed variables.
Initial analysis of the data revealed eight components that met this criterion. However,
the inflection point on the scree plot in Figure 3 supported retention of only the first three
components, as each subsequent component explained relatively little additional model
variance. To determine whether eight components, three components, or some number in
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between provided the most theoretically coherent explanation of the data, several models
were run, in which different numbers of components were retained. The oblique rotation
oblimin, which allows the rotated components to be correlated, was applied.

Figure 3: Scree Plot of Component Eigenvalues

The solution retaining three components was determined to provide the best
representation of key neighborhood dimensions. Additional components either loaded
highly on a single variable, or drew relatively weak connections between two or more
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variables with no obvious interpretation as meaningful neighborhood dimensions. The
three retained components together explained 66 percent of the variance of the original
variables. With eigenvalues ranging from 2.82 to 2.89, each of the combined variables
had nearly the same explanatory power as three of the original variables. Table 3 shows
the loading of each variable on the retained components.

Table 3. Component Loadings

hs.pct.00
female_labor.pct.00
poverty.pct.00
mfi.ratio.00
unemp.pct.00
own.pct.00
homes_multi_unit.pct.00
density.00.ratio
mhmval.00.ratio
black.pct.00
other.race.00
hh_female_kids.pct.00
homes_vacant.pct.00

TC1
0.84
-0.78
0.62
-0.59
0.56
-0.02
-0.14
-0.07
-0.39
0.02
0.45
0.24
0.18

TC2
-0.31
0.14
0.34
-0.44
0.18
-0.94
0.91
0.57
0.42
-0.05
0.21
0.22
-0.22

TC3
-0.08
0.24
0.31
-0.3
0.36
0.02
-0.07
0.02
-0.32
0.89
-0.8
0.79
0.52

The first neighborhood dimension is primarily an index of population class status
and neighborhood distress. It considers the local population’s economic strengths and
vulnerabilities in shaping the overall wellbeing of the neighborhood. It indicates that
poorly educated populations are disconnected from the local labor market, and
furthermore that these issues of human capital and social organization are associated with
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low levels of neighborhood economic wellbeing, in terms of poverty, income, and
employment. Interestingly, other.race.00, representing the percentage of the population
that is neither non-Hispanic black nor non-Hispanic white, also loads against this
component in a positive direction, indicating that this neighborhood dimension may in
part describe resident socioeconomic distress in poor neighborhoods for reasons unrelated
to the well-documented discrimination and isolation of the African American community.
Regardless of the demographic composition of the resident population, census tracts with
higher values on this dimension are likely to be struggling with more severe
socioeconomic distress than the average poor census tract.

The second neighborhood dimension is an urbanization index. It describes the
degree to which the composition of the housing stock resembles the typical high-density
urban neighborhood where most families rent and much of the housing stock consists of
apartments and other multi-unit structures. It also describes the population density of a
census tract relative to the metropolitan area in which it is situated. Thus, one would
expect the census tracts with the highest positive values on this dimension to be located
in the urban core, while those with high negative values to occupy the metropolitan
fringe.

The third neighborhood dimension describes the demographic characteristics of
the resident population. Specifically though, it is an index of black socioeconomic
isolation, as indicated by the opposite loadings for black.pct.00 and other.race.00.
Although the percent white variable was not included in the PCA, preliminary analysis
suggests that if it had been, it would have contrasted with black.pct.00 in much the same
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way. It represents the ugly reality that concentrated poverty is a problem that continues to
disproportionately affect the African American community. Compounding the
geographic isolation of poor black populations are high rates of home vacancy and a high
percentage of single-parent households headed by females.

The results of the PCA were encouraging, as the three retained components
appear to represent meaningful neighborhood dimensions. Furthermore, each component
corresponds to one of the neighborhood attribute types described by Galster, which
served as the guide for variable selection in this study. The first dimension is most
strongly associated with the five class status variables. In addition to three of the four
housing variables, the second dimension is also described by the relative population
density variable, which was used to represent proximity characteristics. The dimension of
black socioeconomic isolation includes the three demographic indicators plus one
variable describing the qualities of the local housing stock.

3.6.2 Neighborhood Classification
The BIC values of the alternative clustering algorithms for solutions from one to
fifteen clusters are displayed in Figure 4. The procedure found that a ten-cluster solution
based on an algorithm producing ellipsoidal clusters of varying shape, volume, and
orientation (VVV) produced the best model fit.
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Figure 4: Bayesian Information Criterion Values for Alternative Cluster Solutions

On the other hand, the authors of the mclust package, who also developed the
model-based approach to clustering it employs, suggest that a parameterization with
fewer clusters may be preferable to the solution with the absolute highest BIC if it forms
a decisive local maximum (Fraley & Raftery, 1998). While the VVV algorithm forms
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both a local and global maximum at ten clusters, the amount of additional information
gained from adding more clusters drops off sharply beyond five clusters, relative to the
cost of additional model complexity. Thus, it was necessary to further examine the
content of the alternative model specifications to determine which cluster solution
provided the best representation of the types of poor neighborhoods.

While the preliminary analysis of the alternative model specifications is not
presented here, in the end I selected the ten-cluster solution. A couple considerations
motivated this decision. First, I found that the degree and manner in which NMTC
investment, LIHTC investment, and socioeconomic change related to one another within
and across neighborhood types was quite consistent as additional clusters were added, up
to and including the ten-cluster solution. The nature of these enduring linkages is
discussed in depth later in this chapter.

Second, whereas the five-cluster solution grouped census tracts into relatively
broad neighborhood archetypes, the more complex specification allowed for a more
nuanced examination of underlying relationships between socioeconomic change and
place-based investment patterns. To illustrate, the ten-cluster solution identified multiple
neighborhood types that experienced socioeconomic ascent from 2000 to 2009-2013.
While gentrification commonly serves as a blanket term to describe positive economic
gains in poor neighborhoods, scholars recognize it is just one potential pathway of
socioeconomic ascent. Other pathways of ascent, notably marginal gentrification,
upgrading, and incumbent upgrading, may be partially or entirely distinct from traditional
notions of gentrification (Owens, 2012; Van Criekingen & Decroly, 2003). It is also
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recognized that conditions can deteriorate in a neighborhood for more than one reason.
Though socioeconomic trajectories leading to little change over time have received less
attention, it stands to reason that there are multiple pathways of stability as well.
Comparing the intensity of NMTC and LIHTC activity in poor neighborhoods that were
characterized by different combinations of attributes in 2000, but that followed similar
socioeconomic trajectories over the course of the 2000s, may allow for a more detailed
understanding of the underlying neighborhood- level drivers of place-based investment.

Table 4 provides the group means for the initial attributes and socioeconomic
changes of each cluster, as well as the percentage of census tracts in each cluster that
received investment through NMTC, LIHTC, or both programs. Though the
neighborhood types identified by cluster analysis have no inherent order, I organized
them in ascending order of relative population density.
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Table 4. Census Tract Characteristics
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Cluster
n
Year 2000 attributes (% unless noted)
Total population (mil)
Poverty rate
MFI ratio (tract/metro)
Unemployment
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Recent immigrants
Foreign-born
High school diploma or less
Bachelors or more
Females in labor force
Work in management position
Vacancy rate
Housing owner-occupied
Population density (mi2 )
Pop. density ratio (tract/metro)
Homes in multi-unit structures
Home value ratio (tract/metro)
2000 to 2009-2013 SES change
Poverty (percentage point)

1
1073

2
1259

3
469

4
2688

5
1770

6
2520

7
1420

8
1588

9
1361

10
602

4.1
17.38
73.65
6.86
71.52
12.24
12.69
1.09
2.72
6.47
67.10
9.12
50.67
20.69
11.53
76.39
1185
36.05
6.81
0.61

5.7
25.74
64.65
11.22
13.52
2.98
78.00
4.10
14.73
37.74
77.21
6.01
44.94
14.81
5.80
58.94
7311
117.59
19.16
0.64

1.7
23.95
61.61
10.15
48.80
37.37
10.73
1.71
3.97
8.29
69.26
8.37
52.05
18.01
11.15
58.23
4277
121.33
21.59
0.54

10.9
17.64
71.47
7.02
57.21
12.77
22.58
5.33
8.58
17.40
56.31
15.99
56.89
24.65
6.74
50.05
6630
141.36
40.32
0.72

5.9
29.36
54.37
14.23
10.22
86.46
2.31
0.47
1.02
2.29
66.80
8.51
52.81
18.69
13.69
56.12
6380
158.42
23.96
0.47

9.5
24.07
60.56
9.67
44.09
32.02
18.05
3.89
8.16
16.01
58.75
15.67
55.93
23.54
10.00
39.04
10087
182.30
52.99
0.67

4.5
37.21
43.37
17.18
14.23
76.87
6.69
1.40
3.79
7.73
67.24
10.01
52.48
20.10
14.13
29.06
12420
198.85
62.32
0.58

6.2
37.09
43.46
16.01
21.50
24.18
46.97
4.90
13.29
27.29
74.24
7.64
44.80
16.22
9.83
27.59
20642
205.03
61.59
0.60

5.8
24.74
55.05
9.43
25.56
4.56
54.53
13.29
25.25
51.25
66.12
15.76
48.06
21.77
4.57
23.95
32941
225.85
77.70
0.86

2.2
22.67
71.22
5.97
63.85
12.66
13.02
8.38
10.89
17.86
29.65
43.11
66.61
42.11
6.32
22.24
13863
262.72
76.80
1.02

4.14

2.64

7.16

5.72

6.65

6.10

3.41

1.89

1.27

4.49

Table 4 (continued)
MFI ($)
MFI ratio
Unemployment (percentage point)
Median home value ($)
2003-2007 investment
NMTC and LIHTC
NMTC
LIHTC

-2390
1.18
6.31
13031

-3094
-1.22
2.45
35449

-5691
-4.44
6.89
12827

-4219
-2.42
5.40
35185

-6025
-4.42
8.18
7637

-3185
-1.70
4.99
38185

-793
1.30
4.46
46302

-771
0.36
1.32
60936

-126
0.72
2.04
131832

6126
10.82
2.88
63865

0.19
2.14
3.63

0.48
3.42
9.21

0.43
3.84
8.32

0.63
3.46
8.33

0.34
3.73
10.34

1.23
6.23
10.83

1.48
7.39
17.04

2.46
9.26
17.00

1.10
5.22
7.94

1.16
6.31
7.64
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3.6.3 Types of Poor Neighborhoods
This section discusses the initial attributes, subsequent socioeconomic trajectories,
and the intensity of place-based investment for each neighborhood type. Also provided
are a series of tables and maps. The tables show the ten large metro areas that had the
highest percentage of poor census tracts of each type in 2000 1 . The maps show the
distribution of each neighborhood type in metropolitan Atlanta, which was one of seven
metro areas that had at least one census tract from each neighborhood type.

1

Though this study includes census tracts from 276 metropolitan areas, these rankings only consider the
50 largest metro areas by population in 2000. Many of the smaller metro areas had only one or two
census tracts in the analysis; thus, they tended to dominate the rankings for each neighborhood type,
without providing any useful insight about neighborhood type.
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3.6.3.1 Cluster 1: stable white exurbs

Figure 5: Cluster 1 Map

Cluster 1 represents poverty in the semi-rural metropolitan outskirts. This is the
only cluster made up of tracts that were less densely populated than their surrounding
metro areas. Not surprisingly then, the housing stock was dominated by owner-occupied,
single- family homes. This cluster also had highest percentage of white residents, and was
the least distressed of all the clusters in 2000, in terms of both poverty rate and MFI ratio.
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Socioeconomic outcomes in Cluster 1 were mixed. Cluster 1 experienced weak
housing appreciation and above average increases in poverty, relative to poor census
tracts overall. Though all but one of the neighborhood types saw inflation-adjusted
income decrease over the course of the 2000s, the $2,390 drop in MFI for Cluster 1 was
slightly worse than the average for all neighborhood types. On the other hand, the
positive value on mfi.ratio.ch indicates that the within- metro rank of Cluster 1 tracts
actually improved over the same period. A likely explanatio n for the contrast of worsethan-average absolute income change but better-than-average relative income change is
that Cluster 1 is populated by tracts located in metro areas that were especially hard-hit
by the economic recession of the late-2000s.

The relatively low levels of socioeconomic distress in 2000 might lead one to
suspect that this neighborhood type would have been attractive to risk-averse developers.
Instead, it saw the lowest levels of both NMTC and LIHTC investment from 2001-2007.
Furthermore, this is only neighborhood type in which not a single census tract was
targeted by both programs.

Table 5: Top 10 Metro Areas by Percent in Cluster 1
Metropolitan Area
Tulsa, OK
Birmingham-Hoover, AL
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL
Pittsburgh, PA
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro-Franklin, TN
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Tucson, AZ

Pct. of Poor Census Tracts in MSA
43.53
34.04
30.94
22.78
21.35
17.24
16.46
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Oklahoma City, OK
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL

15.00
13.07
12.63

3.6.3.2 Cluster 2: Hispanic immigrant gateways

Figure 6: Cluster 2 Map

Cluster 2 census tracts are heavily concentrated in metropolitan areas adjacent to
the Mexican border in California and Texas, and in California’s agricultural heartland.
This cluster is notable for the overall absence of both white and black non-Hispanic
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residents, and the dominance of Hispanics, recent immigrants, and foreign-born residents.
The residents of these neighborhoods have among the lowest levels of educational
attainment, workforce participation, and employment in high-status (management) jobs.
Thus, the neighborhood dimension describing high levels of economic distress and low
levels of human capital is a defining feature of Cluster 2.

Taken together, these attributes suggest the interpretation of this cluster as a
distinct type of immigrant neighborhood. Specifically, these places serve as the initial
landing points for large numbers of economic migrants arriving to the United States from
Mexico and Central America, many of whom may be undocumented (Hill & Johnson,
2011).

From 2000 to 2009-2013, this cluster remained relatively stable. On two of the
socioeconomic indicators- poverty change and unemployment change, the tracts in this
cluster fared better than average. On the other hand, home value appreciation was
somewhat slower, and MFI declined, both in absolute terms and relative to MFI change
in their respective metro areas.

While place-based investment was somewhat more frequent in this Cluster 2 than
in Cluster 1, the percentage of census tracts receiving investment for both NMTC and
LIHTC was well below average.
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Table 6: Top 10 Metro Areas by Percent in Cluster 2
Metropolitan Area
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX
El Paso, TX
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX
Fresno, CA
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX

Pct. of Poor Census Tracts in MSA
88.00
77.01
49.13
34.00
26.84
22.12
22.11
20.58
16.99
16.71

3.6.3.3 Cluster 3: racially heterogeneous neighborhoods

Figure 7: Cluster 3 Map
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Cluster 3 was the least common neighborhood type, representing only 3.2 percent
of the census tracts included in the study. It is also somewhat difficult to concisely define,
as its baseline attributes do not immediately evoke the image of a specific kind of poor
place that exists empirically, theoretically, or in the public consciousness. However, the
map provides some important context. It shows that only one of the Cluster 3 tracts in
metropolitan Atlanta was located within Atlanta city limits. The rest tended to be located
in the county seats of the counties making up the periphery of the metro region (e.g.
Conyers, Covington, and Griffin, GA). Thus, whereas Cluster 1 represented semi-rural
neighborhood poverty, Cluster 3 may represent small-town neighborhood poverty.

Cluster 3 had the second lowest population density; however, these tracts were
still somewhat denser than their respective metro areas, which indicates that they tended
to be situated in relatively small metro areas that were not highly urbanized. The housing
markets in these places were quite weak in 2000, with home values barely half the metro
averages and above average vacancy rates.

The demographic profile of this cluster finds that these neighborhoods were home
to a relatively even mix of black and white residents who were born in the United States.
This is only one of three clusters that was not majority black, white, or Hispanic. Very
few of the residents are Hispanic, Asian, or foreign born. Moreover, the population is
poorly educated, with an above-average percentage of adults with a high school degree or
less, and very few residents with at least a bachelor’s degree.
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The most notable facet of Cluster 3 is that it suffered significant socioeconomic
decline over the course of the 2000s. Cluster 3 was either the worst or second worst
performer on all five indicators of socioeconomic change. Place-based investment played
little part in mitigating the economic freefall Cluster 3 experienced, as the intensity of
investment was below average for both NMTC and LIHTC.

Table 7: Top 10 Metro Areas by Percent in Cluster 3
Metropolitan Area
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC
Indianapolis-Carmel-Anderson, IN
Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJDE-MD
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL
Pittsburgh, PA
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach,
FL
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Oklahoma City, OK
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Pct. of Poor Census Tracts in MSA
17.07
10.31
9.09
9.01
8.84
7.22
6.78
6.32
6.25
5.83

3.6.3.4 Cluster 4: moderate-poverty and medium-density

Figure 8: Cluster 4 Map

Cluster 4 was the most common type of poor neighborhood, capturing almost one
in five census tracts. Cluster 4 was in a virtual tie with Cluster 1 as having the lowest
initial levels of socioeconomic distress in terms of both poverty rate and MFI ratio. While
both clusters were majority-white, there was more racial diversity to be found in Cluster
4. The population of Cluster 4 was relatively well-educated and was also more actively
engaged with the surrounding labor market than in most other neighborhood types, as
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indicated by high rates of female labor force participation and employment in
management positions.

In contrast to its initial stability, the socioeconomic trajectory of Cluster 4 during
the 2000s was worse than the overall average on all five indicators. Similarly, the
percentages of census tracts in Cluster 4 that received either NMTC or LIHTC
investment was somewhat lower than in other neighborhood types.

Table 8: Top 10 Metro Areas by Percent in Cluster 4
Metropolitan Area
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA
Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV
Sacramento--Roseville--Arden-Arcade, CA
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI
Fresno, CA
San Diego-Carlsbad, CA

Pct. of Poor Census Tracts in MSA
62.96
51.75
42.57
38.21
32.69
31.58
31.05
30.70
30.00
29.05

3.6.4.5 Cluster 5: lower-density segregated black neighborhoods
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Figure 9: Cluster 5 Map

Even in comparison to other poor places, Cluster 5 is notable for its high poverty
rates, as well as income levels that were barely half of the metro averages. The extreme
poverty conditions of Cluster 5 disproportionately affected the African American
community, as over 86 percent of residents in 2000 were black. This was the most
extreme concentration of any racial or ethnic group among the ten neighborhood types.
The social and economic isolation of the black population is perhaps the most wellknown and well-documented aspect of poverty in the US. The persistent dislocation of
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the African American community from local labor markets is one of the major themes to
have emerged in the literature on concentrated poverty in the last three decades (Massey,
1993; Wilson, 2012). Thus, it is not surprising to see Cluster 5 typified by year 2000
attributes that suggest a lack of economic opportunity, such as low levels of education
and female labor force participation, very few residents employed in high-status jobs, and
high rates of female-headed households.

Though the poverty and racial isolation just described may evoke stereotyped
images of inner-city ghettos, these tracts were among the least densely populated.
Looking at the metro areas where Cluster 5 was most common in 2000, two distinct
contexts emerge. The first places Cluster 5 into smaller metro areas in the Mississippi
River Delta, and the Deep South more generally. The second context places Cluster 5
tracts into some of the primary destinations for the waves of rural southern blacks during
the Great Migration (McHugh, 1987). Furthermore, some of the larger metro areas where
this neighborhood type is common, such as Detroit, St. Louis, and Baltimore, are
commonly associated with racial segregation, as well as difficult and sometimes
traumatic race relations, both by research and in the public consciousness. With above
average vacancy rates and median home prices less than half the metro averages, the
neighborhoods in this cluster would likely show some of the telltale physical signs of
concentrated poverty, including a housing stock that could be described as run down, or
potentially even dilapidated.

Cluster 5 recorded the worst 2000 to 2009-2013 outcomes of all the neighborhood
types on the MFI, unemployment, and median home values indicators, and were second
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worst in MFI ratio and poverty rate changes. Unfortunately, there was relatively little
place-based investment in Cluster 5 tracts to help mitigate the wholesale socioeconomic
decline, as NMTC investment in Cluster 5 was well below average, while LIHTC
investment was right at the group mean.

Table 9: Top 10 Metro Areas by Percent in Cluster 5
Metropolitan Area
Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI
Memphis, TN-MS-AR
St. Louis, MO-IL
Baltimore-Columbia- Towson, MD
Birmingham-Hoover, AL
Kansas City, MO-KS
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD
New Orleans-Metairie, LA
Cleveland-Elyria, OH
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC
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Pct. of Poor Census Tracts in MSA
58.68
51.40
49.33
48.19
39.36
35.83
34.53
34.42
29.78
26.73

3.6.3.6 Cluster 6: the “average” poor neighborhood

Figure 10: Cluster 6 Map

Cluster 6 was perhaps the most difficult of all neighborhood types to describe, as
it did not stand out compared to poor census tracts overall on any year 2000
neighborhood attribute. On the other hand, the socioeconomic trajectory of Cluster 6 was
at least one standard deviation worse than the metro average on all five change indicators.
For NMTC and LIHTC investment intensity, the same “average” pattern reemerged.

Table 10: Top 10 Metro Areas by Percent in Cluster 6
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Metropolitan Area
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV
Providence-Warwick, RI-MA
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH
Sacramento--Roseville--Arden-Arcade, CA
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN
Oklahoma City, OK
Buffalo-Cheektowaga-Niagara Falls, NY

Pct. of Poor Census Tracts in MSA
31.71
31.37
28.42
28.04
27.64
26.32
25.74
25.41
24.17
23.46

3.6.3.7 Cluster 7: black distressed urban neighborhoods

Figure 11: Cluster 7 Map
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Cluster 7 was the most severely distressed type of poor neighborhood in 2000, as
it had the lowest average MFI ratio and highest poverty rate. Three quarters of Cluster 7
residents were black, reinforcing the persistent link between race and concentrated
poverty. Other indicators of population and neighborhood distress were also present, as
these tracts had the highest unemployment rates and highest vacancy rates.

In these important respects, Cluster 7 and Cluster 5 appear to subtle variations of
the same basic kind of poor and racially isolated neighborhood. However, there are some
notable differences. For one, Cluster 7 tracts were much more densely populated- they
had twice the average population density as Cluster 5 tracts, and were also twice as dense
as their metro averages. In terms of 2000 to 2009-2013 change, Cluster 7 fared much
better than Cluster 5, and better than poor census tracts overall on all five indicators. In
particular, MFI ratio change was positive in Cluster 7 tracts, indicating that these tracts
improved their status within their respective metropolitan areas during the 2000s.

Furthermore, whereas Cluster 5 tracts had below average levels of place-based
investment, Cluster 7 had the highest percentage of tracts with LIHTC activity and the
second highest percentage of tracts with NMTC activity.

Table 11: Top 10 Metro Areas by Percent in Cluster 7
Metropolitan Area
Rochester, NY
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI

Pct. of Poor Census Tracts in MSA
44.29
34.45
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Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN
New Orleans-Metairie, LA
Buffalo-Cheektowaga-Niagara Falls, NY
Memphis, TN-MS-AR
Cleveland-Elyria, OH

3.6.3.8 Cluster 8: diverse distressed urban neighborhoods

Figure 12: Cluster 8 Map
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27.72
26.97
25.00
24.59
22.73
20.99
19.63
19.10

Cluster 8 was in a virtual tie with Cluster 7 as the most economically distressed
neighborhood type in 2000. While Cluster 7 poverty was associated with the racial and
economic segregation of blacks, Cluster 8 was much more diverse, with a large Hispanic
population and high percentage of foreign-born residents.

With a poorly educated adult population, low levels of workforce participation,
and few people working in high-status management positions, Cluster 8 appears to most
heavily reflect the role of human capital in the formation and persistence of concentrated
poverty.

Despite its weak starting point, Cluster 8 remained quite stable from 2000 to
2009-2013 in terms of poverty, unemployment, and income levels. Home value growth in
Cluster 8 was greater than in other neighborhood types during the 2000s as well.

Cluster 8 attracted a significant amount of place-based investment during the
2000s, as NMTC investment was highest in this cluster, and was in a virtual tie for the
highest levels of LIHTC investment with Cluster 7 tracts.

Table 12: Top 10 Metro Areas by Percent in Cluster 8
Metropolitan Area
Providence-Warwick, RI-MA
Fresno, CA
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH
Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA
San Diego-Carlsbad, CA
San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI
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Pct. of Poor Census Tracts in MSA
40.20
27.00
21.86
18.69
17.82
17.78
16.99
16.76
15.90
15.79

3.6.3.9 Cluster 9: high-density immigrant gateways in big metropolitan areas

Figure 13: Cluster 9 Map

By a wide margin, Cluster 9 was the most densely populated neighborhood type.
With 32,941 people per square mile, the average census tract in Cluster 9 had a higher
population density than New York City. Despite having the highest levels of overall
density, these tracts are ranked second in terms of density relative to density in the
surrounding metro. This discrepancy suggests that this neighborhood type is a feature of
large urban centers. Thus, it is little surprise that this was the most common type of
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neighborhood in the nation’s two largest urban agglomerations, New York City and Los
Angeles, and the second most common poor neighborhood type in Chicago and San
Francisco. Cluster 9 tracts were prominent in many other metro areas with large
immigrant populations.

Multi-family rental housing was especially common in Cluster 9. With large
populations came significant housing demand as well, as the percentage of housing units
that were vacant in 2000 was lower in Cluster 9 than in any other type of poor
neighborhood.

Whereas some of the other immigrant clusters were specifically tied to
immigration from Latin America, Cluster 9 tracts had the highest concentration of Asian
residents in 2000, suggesting that proximity to the Mexican border is not the primary
explanation for the large numbers of foreign-born residents.

Cluster 9 was on a path of strong socioeconomic ascent from 2000 to 2009-2013.
While poverty increased in all ten neighborhood types over the course of the 2000s, it
increased the least in Cluster 9. The most notable aspect of ascent may be the explosion
in housing prices. The median home in Cluster 9 increased in value by nearly $132,000
during the 2000s, more than three times the average for poor census tracts overall.

Despite the clear upward socioeconomic trajectory, place-based investment in
Cluster 9 was average. The percentage of Cluster 9 tracts with NMTC activity was
slightly above average, while LIHTC activity was slightly below.
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Table 13: Top 10 Metro Areas by Percent in Cluster 9
Metropolitan Area
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA
San Diego-Carlsbad, CA
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI
San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MDWV
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH
Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA
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Pct. of Poor Census Tracts in MSA
35.23
30.31
20.67
19.10
17.44
16.71
13.41
11.68
8.91
8.11

3.6.3.10 Cluster 10: college town neighborhoods

Figure 14: Cluster 10 Map

As discussed in the methods section, I excluded from the analysis a small subset
of “high poverty-high income” census tracts that were found to be poor primarily due to
their proximity to large university campuses. However, even after taking this step, the
cluster analysis still identified a group of highly educated, moderately distressed census
tracts as a distinct neighborhood type. Cluster 10 was the most common neighborhood
type in many smaller metro areas in which the local economy is defined by a large
research university, such as Iowa City, IA, Ithaca, NY, and Lawrence, KS.
81

Cluster 10 arguably improved more than any other neighborhood type during the
2000s. For one, it was the only cluster in which inflation-adjusted median income
increased. It was also the only cluster in which, by 2009-2013, the average MFI ratio had
increased to above 80 percent threshold that serves as one of the primary NMTC
eligibility criteria. Thus, many of the census tracts in Cluster 10 that were eligible for
NMTC in 2000 based on the MFI ratio requirement were likely no longer eligible by the
end of the decade.

The only indicator in which Cluster 10 was not among the top one or two
performers was poverty. The contrast of steady poverty against a backdrop of significant
improvement on the other four socioeconomic indicators lends support for the idea that
the cause of poverty in Cluster 10 is a function of student housing, which is annually
replenished with a new cohort of temporarily poor freshmen.

The biggest contrast between NMTC and LIHTC investment levels occurred in
Cluster 10, where NMTC investment was 1.2 percentage points above the overall average
while LIHTC investment was 2.08 percentage points below average.

Table 14: Top 10 Metro Areas by Percent in Cluster 10

Metropolitan Area
Austin-Round Rock, TX
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI
San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO
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Pct. of Poor Census Tracts in MSA
17.24
15.79
14.36
13.48
13.16
11.68
11.54

Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA
Columbus, OH
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MDWV

11.11
10.78
9.76

3.6.4 SES Change and Investment Patterns
3.6.4.1 SES change
Figure 15 plots the 2000 to 2009-2013 changes in MFI, MFI ratio, poverty,
unemployment, and home values for each neighborhood type. All values were
standardized as z-scores, and poverty and unemployment were recoded to give a uniform
interpretation for positive and negative values on all change indicators.

Overall, the direction of socioeconomic change for each neighborhood type was
consistent across all measures. One exception is Cluster 2, Hispanic Immigrant Gateway
neighborhoods, which saw less income and home value growth than other poor
neighborhood types, yet fared better in terms of poverty and unemployment change. The
relative stability in Cluster 2 on the latter two indicators may reflect one of the few
positive externalities recognized in the literature as arising out of certain contexts of
concentrated poverty. Because many gateway neighborhoods are populated by residents
hailing from the same city, or even the same neighborhood in their country of origin
(Massey, Goldring, & Durand, 1994), those preexisting social ties and institutions may
facilitate the assimilation of new arrivals by providing enhanced access to social services
and employment opportunities (P. A. Jargowsky, 2009).
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The other notable exception is Cluster 10, College Town Neighborhoods. The
contrast of slightly above average growth in the poverty rate against strong performance
on the other four measures seen is most likely a function of the annual churn of
graduating seniors being replaced with new cohorts of temporarily poor freshmen, which
naturally makes poverty an enduring feature in these neighborhoods, regardless of other
socioeconomic trends.

As mentioned earlier, I organized the neighborhood clusters in order from least to
most densely populated, relative to the population density of the surrounding metro area.
Thus, Figure 15 shows a clear association between higher initial relative population
density and better subsequent socioeconomic outcomes. Socioeconomic ascent was
almost entirely concentrated in the four clusters with the highest relative population
densities. Clusters 1 and 2, which had the lowest relative densities, experienced belowaverage outcomes on multiple indicators, while Clusters 3 through 6 experienced worse
outcomes than the average poor census tract on all five indicators of socioeconomic
change.

Lending further support for the notion that population density was one of the
primary drivers of socioeconomic ascent for poor neighborhoods during the 2000s,
neither the neighborhood distress index nor the black isolation index was significantly
related to any of the socioeconomic change indicators. On the other hand, the
neighborhood dimension represented by the urbanization index was significantly
correlated with 2000 to 2009-2013 income growth, r = .69, p < .05, home value growth, r
= .65, p < .05 and falling unemployment r = .75, p < .05.
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Higher Population Density Associated with Better
Socioeconomic Outcomes
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Figure 15: 2000 to 2009-2013 Socioeconomic Changes by Cluster

3.6.4.2 NMTC and LIHTC investment
There was a significant relationship between the percent of census tracts in a
neighborhood cluster that received NMTC investment and the percent that received
LIHTC investment, r = .83, p < .01. The percent of census tracts that received both
NMTC and LIHTC investment was also significantly correlated with NMTC investment,
r = .97, p < .0001, and LIHTC investment, r = .78, p < .01.

The consistent parallels in NMTC investment and LIHTC investment within and
across neighborhood types suggests at least two things. First, it lends support for the idea
that, because NMTC and LIHTC employ similar market-driven mechanisms to deliver
resources into distressed areas, they are drawn towards the same types of poor places.
Second, it shows that the neighborhood dimensions uncovered by the PCA, which
provided the basis for classifying distinct types of poor neighborhoods, do bear some
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meaningful resemblance to the unobserved neighborhood characteristics that NMTC and
LIHTC developers pay attention to and care about when making location decisions. To
the degree that these assertions are accurate, using this typology to further investigate
NMTC and LIHTC investment may yield important new insights about the unobserved
neighborhood- level drivers of treatment selection in these kinds of market-driven
programs.

Visualizing NMTC and LIHTC investment patterns across the neighborhood
types provides an immediate clue about at least one important factor. Figure 16 shows a
clear trend towards increasing levels of NMTC and LIHTC investment in more densely
populated clusters. Thus, it is not surprising that the urbanization index was significantly
correlated with the percent of census tracts that received both NMTC and LIHTC
investment, r = .78, p < .01, the percent that received NMTC, r = .83, p < .01, and was
significant at the ten percent level for LIHTC investment. There was no significant
association between NMTC or LIHTC investment and either of the two other
neighborhood dimensions.
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Higher Population Density Generally Associated
with more Place-based Investment
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Figure 16: NMTC and LIHTC Investment Intensity by Cluster

However, the sharp drop in the percentage of census tracts receiving investment
in clusters 9 and 10 suggests that NMTC and LIHTC locational patterns during the 2000s
were not only a function of urbanization. Further analysis revealed that the initial level of
socioeconomic distress in a census tract was the other major factor driving NMTC and
LIHTC locational patterns. Figure 17 highlights the marked difference in the initial
poverty rates and MFI ratios of high-density clusters with high levels of NMTC and
LIHTC investment (clusters 7 and 8) and those with relatively little investment (clusters 9
and 10). On both measures, Cluster 7 and Cluster 8 were the two most socioeconomically
distressed neighborhood types in 2000. In contrast, Cluster 9 was average among
neighborhood types on both measures, while Cluster 10 was somewhat better off than the
average for all neighborhood types in 2000.
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Cluster Poverty and Income Levels in 2000
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Figure 17: Standardized Poverty Rate and MFI Ratio by Cluster in 2000

The link between initial levels of socioeconomic distress and subsequent NMTC
and LIHTC investment may also explain why there was no significant association
between a neighborhood type’s 2000 to 2009-2013 socioeconomic change and the
frequency of place-based investment. As discussed in Chapter 2 and at the beginning of
this chapter, both NMTC and LIHTC include provisions intended to influence the
behavior of the actors involved in their administration and use by providing various
additional incentives for locating projects into areas with higher levels of socioeconomic
distress than basic program requirements dictate. Thus, the apparent attraction of NMTC
and LIHTC investment to highly distressed neighborhoods over places with similar levels
of population density that were only moderately distressed, may be a function of these
provisions, rather than a reflection of the true preferences of market actors.
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This finding indicates that these provisions are effective tools for distributing
place-based investment dollars to a wider and more diverse array of distressed places
than might otherwise be observed, without being so restrictive as to eliminate program
demand. However, the uneven application of these provisions across all eligible places is
consequential in the context of this study. Given the relatively loose criteria I established
for identifying a study population of low-income, high-poverty census tracts, the study
area is effectively divided into two key subgroups in which different combinations of
NMTC and LIHTC provisions apply. The first subgroup includes the moderately
distressed census tracts that met the basic NMTC requirements, but did not meet the
stricter poverty/income/unemployment requirements to be defined as “high distress”
under NMTC, and similarly did not meet the poverty/income requirements for additional
LIHTC tax credits. The second consists of census tracts that met the additional poverty
and income requirements to receive full consideration and favor of both NMTC and
LIHTC.

The inclusion of census tracts governed by two different sets of incentives
complicates one of the main goals of this study, which is to use the observed locational
patterns of NMTC and LIHTC investment across neighborhood types to discover the
latent drivers of treatment selection related to the preferences of developers. Because
program provisions effectively steer development towards the neighborhood types
primarily populated by high distress census tracts, the true preferences of developers are
obscured.
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3.6.5 Analysis of Severely distressed Subset
To eliminate, or at least reduce, the influence of the various NMTC and LIHTC
program provisions on developers’ decision-making processes, I ran the same analysis
just discussed on a subset of severely distressed census tracts. As mentioned in the
Methods section, this severely distressed subset consists of 5,161 census tracts that in
2000 had both (a) greater than 25 percent poverty and (b) MFI ratio less than 60 percent.
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 15, and main results and analysis are
presented below.
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Table 15. Descriptive Statistics of Severely distressed Clusters
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Cluster
1
2
3
n
517
546
956
Year 2000 Attributes (% unless noted)
Poverty
29.42 31.88 34.56
MFI Ratio (tract/metro)
53.24 51.52 46.85
Unemployment
10.81 12.07 16.17
Black
32.86
4.68 88.30
Hispanic
22.02 79.71
2.60
Asian
3.17
4.24
0.53
Recent immigrant
7.45 19.31
0.96
Foreign-born
14.11 43.22
2.01
High school or less
68.18 81.22 70.40
Bachelors or more
9.30
4.93
6.87
Females in labor force
52.18 43.10 50.62
Work in management
17.69 11.90 17.11
Vacancy rate
11.04
5.80 15.45
Housing owner-occupied
48.16 42.49 50.84
2
Pop density (mi )
6215 11725
6959
Pop. density ratio (tract/metro)
152.24 162.71 173.38
Housing in multi-unit structure
34.38 35.29 27.71
Home value ratio (tract/metro)
0.53
0.58
0.42
Neighborhood Dimension z-scores
Class Status
-0.26
-1.55
0.92
Urbanization
-0.82
-0.75 -0.90
Black Socioeconomic Isolation
-0.82
0.17 -0.19
2000 to 2009-2013 SES Change

4
481

5
603

6
958

7
796

8
304

49.39
31.41
23.27
85.59
5.28
0.96
2.02
3.95
75.70
5.91
45.65
16.11
16.44
25.70
9025
185.26
58.66
0.47

34.38
45.78
14.64
72.58
7.16
1.55
3.75
7.11
65.60
10.64
54.54
20.47
14.60
32.21
10681
195.42
58.77
0.59

34.06
45.75
12.87
12.92
54.53
8.91
19.89
40.12
72.28
9.92
46.00
17.03
7.46
25.48
23528
212.99
65.33
0.67

36.7
43.43
14.17
37.00
23.58
4.33
9.85
18.67
60.79
16.81
52.45
23.84
10.71
21.38
17997
223.78
73.46
0.70

45.23
32.64
18.93
20.77
56.99
5.49
15.26
31.81
76.18
7.69
39.67
17.45
7.68
10.27
43186
261.59
88.46
0.73

1.34
0.44
1.40

0.80
0.14
-0.48

-0.98
0.35
0.03

0.08
0.82
-0.39

-0.52
1.37
1.35

Table 15 (continued)
Poverty
5.31
MFI
-2913
MFI Ratio
-0.88
Unemployment
6.57
Median home value ($)
22200
2003-2007 NMTC/LIHTC Investment
NMTC and LIHTC
1.55
NMTC
5.42
LIHTC
16.83

1.94
-2321
-0.76
2.19
40415

5.72
-4454
-2.46
8.05
6501

0.00
1081
3.88
2.95
32104

4.60
-1381
1.07
6.10
39193

1.07
-768
0.39
2.08
90046

2.73
-3.54
2641
3232
4.54
4.22
2.00
-2.34
73639 115122

0.92
4.76
14.10

0.63
3.87
14.33

1.04
7.69
19.33

1.82
7.46
19.73

2.09
8.66
15.76

3.02
9.92
19.72

3.62
10.53
31.58
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3.6.5.1 Neighborhood dimensions
As before, the first step was to enter the thirteen neighborhood indicators into a
PCA. The variables again coalesced around three neighborhood dimensions. The
component loadings, shown in Table 16, find that the same underlying dimensions that
described the full set of high- and moderate-distress census tracts describe severely
distressed census tracts alone, with only minor differences.

Table 16. Component Loadings for Severely distressed Tracts
black.pct.00
other.race.00
hh_female_kids.pct.00
homes_vacant.pct.00
own.pct.00
homes_multi_unit.pct.00
mhmval.00.ratio
density.00.ratio
hs.pct.00
female_labor.pct.00
poverty.pct.00
mfi.ratio.00
unemp.pct.00

TC1
0.89
-0.89
0.82
0.61
0.1
-0.07
-0.26
-0.02
-0.27
0.36
0.27
-0.29
0.37

TC2
-0.17
0.1
0.11
-0.2
-0.91
0.9
0.61
0.38
-0.41
0.14
0.25
-0.42
0.07

TC3
0.01
0.24
0.23
0.09
-0.12
-0.05
-0.27
-0.09
0.71
-0.71
0.69
-0.65
0.54

The first neighborhood dimension is an index of black isolation. The second
dimension is an urbanization index that, in the severely distressed case, places more
emphasis on relative housing prices than relative population density. The third dimension
is an index of neighborhood distress that incorporates educational attainment and job
status of residents as important definitional components. The main point of departure
between this and the earlier model, is that the black isolation index explains a larger
proportion of the variance in the data when only severely distressed tracts are considered.
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3.6.5.2 Neighborhood Types
The second step was to run a cluster analysis on the neighborhood dimensions.
The cluster solution with the highest BIC, and thus the best model fit, came from an
algorithm producing eight clusters of varying shape, equal volume, and varying
orientation (VEV). Table 17 shows the redistribution of the severely distressed census
tracts from the original cluster to which they belonged to their new cluster in the 8-cluster
solution. Looking across each row, the original clusters 1, 4, and 10 were almost entirely
composed of moderately-distressed census tracts that were excluded from this part of the
analysis. For the original neighborhood clusters that contained larger proportions of
severely distressed tracts, those tracts were in some cases redistributed almost entirely to
a single severely distressed cluster (original clusters 2, 5), while others were divided
between two or three severely distressed clusters (original clusters 3, 6, 9), and a couple
were spread across several severely distressed clusters (original clusters 7, 8). Looking
down each column, the severely distressed clusters were for the most part populated by
subgroups of census tracts from between one and three of the original clusters.

3.6.5.3 SES Change and Investment Patterns
Many of the patterns and trends uncovered in the primary analysis reemerged
when severely distressed census tracts were examined alone. For example, figure 3.6
visualizes the clear and consistent positive association between relative population
density and socioeconomic trajectory. Another similarity that carried over is the parallel
patterning of NMTC and LIHTC investment across severely distressed neighborhood
clusters. There was a significant relationship between the percent of census tracts in a
neighborhood cluster that received NMTC investment, and the percent that received
LIHTC investment, r = .75, p < .05. The percent of census tracts that received both
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NMTC and LIHTC investment in a neighborhood cluster was also significantly
correlated with NMTC investment, r = .90, p < .01, and LIHTC investment, r = .80, p <
.05.

2000 to 2009-2013 socioeconomic change by severely
distressed cluster
2.5
2

1.5
1

0.5
0
-0.5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

-1
-1.5
-2

poverty.ch

mfi.ch

mfi.ratio.ch

unemp.ch

mhmval.ch

Figure 18. SES Change by Severely distressed Cluster

On the other hand, the analysis of severely distressed tracts alone revealed some
points of departure relevant to this study. In the initial analysis, when both moderate- and
severely distressed tracts were included, levels of NMTC and LIHTC investment in a
neighborhood type were not significantly correlated with any of the socioeconomic
change indicators. This was unexpected, as recent studies point out that developers
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utilizing both NMTC and LIHTC are likely to actively seek out areas that, at least in their
minds, are on an upward socioeconomic trajectory.

There are at least three possible explanations for the discrepancy between the
literature and my findings. The first is that, as discussed earlier, the study population is
effectively divided into two subgroups of distressed places according to the relevance of
various determinants of site selection. Another possibility is that developers are
motivated to locate projects into socioeconomically ascending areas, but lack either the
information or insight to make accurate predictions about a poor neighborhood’s future
state. Third, it could be the case that developers’ location decisions are motivated by
factors unrelated to socioeconomic trajectory.

When severely distressed census tracts were examined alone, levels of NMTC and
LIHTC investment in a neighborhood type were significantly correlated with multiple
aspects of socioeconomic change. Thus, it appears that the first explanation is the most
likely. By narrowing the focus to a subset of places where all relevant program provisions
have been satisfied, NMTC and LIHTC locational patterns can be investigated in
contexts where there are no explicit external factors forcing developers to weigh their
natural preferences for neighborhoods bearing certain combinations of attractive
attributes against incentives or disincentives unrelated to these attributes.

Having removed the influence of provisions designed to make moderate-distress
census tracts less attractive that severely distressed ones, Figure 3.7 shows a positive
association between relative population density and frequency of place-based investment
that is uninterrupted.
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Level of place-based investment by severely distressed
cluster
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Figure 19. NMTC & LIHTC Investment by Severely distressed Cluster

The urbanization dimension was significantly positively correlated with all five
measures of 2000 to 2009-2013 socioeconomic change, as well as with all three measures
of place-based investment (percent of tracts that received (a) NMTC, (b) LIHTC, and (c)
NMTC and LIHTC). In other words, higher scores on the urbanization index were
associated with both socioeconomic ascent and higher levels of place-based investment.

There was also a significant association between higher scores on the black
isolation index and declines in 2000 to 2009-2013 poverty. The two neighborhood
clusters with the highest average scores on the black isolation index also had the highest
initial poverty rates of all the severely distressed clusters. Thus, it is possible that this
association may reflect encouraging gains made within the poorest and most racially
isolated neighborhood types; alternatively, it is also possibly a ceiling effect of sorts.
There were no significant correlations with either of the other two neighborhood
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dimensions. Furthermore, the observed neighborhood attributes associated with
urbanization, such as percent owner-occupied homes, percent of housing in multi-unit
structures, and population density, were all significantly correlated with most or all
socioeconomic change measures, as well as NMTC/LIHTC investment measures. Only a
few other observed neighborhood variables that were unrelated to urbanization were
correlated with single measures of socioeconomic change or NMTC/LIHTC investment.

Thus, it appears that the preferences of developers seeking locations for NMTC
and LIHTC-subsidized development were in large part a function of how urbanized an
area was.

3.7 Discussion & Conclusions
This study has several important theoretical and applied policymaking
implications. First, the two neighborhood typologies that were identified, one containing
both moderate-distress and severely distressed census tracts, and the other focused on
severely distresseded census tracts alone, underscore the reality that the consequences of
concentrated poverty are a problem facing a diverse range of places and populations. The
classification of poor census tracts according to their levels of socioeconomic distress,
urbanization, and black isolation revealed the existence of several distinct types of poor
places that exist throughout the metropolitan landscape from the inner cities to the
outlying suburbs, and that are home to populations of all variety of demographic
backgrounds.

Second, while calls to recognize the problem of suburban poverty have gotten
louder and more frequent in recent years, the finding that urbanization was a primary
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driver of both socioeconomic ascent and multiple forms of place-based investment
highlights the challenges that distressed neighborhoods in the suburbs must confront. The
current popularity of market-based solutions that tend to favor more densely populated
areas suggests the need for policy solutions that specifically address the issue of suburban
poverty, which is still too often overlooked.

Third, the finding that NMTC and LIHTC investment patterns closely mirrored
one another across the different neighborhood types justifies two of the primary concerns
that motivated this dissertation. The first is that the preferences of developers, who play a
key role in determining where NMTC and LIHTC-subsidized projects are located, have
not been studied in depth, leading to uncertainty in evaluations of program impact that
treatment selection has been fully and adequately specified. Given the similar
mechanisms through which NMTC and LIHTC resources are delivered into poor
neighborhoods, the parallel locational patterns of NMTC and LIHTC investment are
likely driven by a common underlying force. Although they have never been examined
together, previous studies of both programs independently suggest that this force is
related to the preferences of developers.

The analysis found that neighborhood attributes relating to the level of
urbanization, moderated by program provisions that favor investment in severely
distressed over moderate-distress areas, largely accounted for the locational patterns of
both NMTC and LIHTC investment. Thus, this study offers the clearest image yet of the
preference structure of market actors involved in programs like NMTC and LIHTC.
Ensuring that census tracts that received either NMTC or LIHTC investment had
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identical pre-treatment levels of urbanization as those selected to provide the
counterfactual addresses this model’s misspecification concern, which has been
independently raised in previous studies of both programs.

The second concern motivating this dissertation is that, due to their underlying
similarities, evaluating the impact of either program on neighborhood conditions will lead
to biased estimates if the presence of the other program in similar kinds of poor places is
not taken into account. The neighborhood types identified through the cluster analysis are
defined by their similar configurations along three complex, underlying neighbor hood
dimensions. That such strong parallels in NMTC and LIHTC investment patterns were
observed in this complex setting suggests this concern is not unfounded.
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CHAPTER 4
THE EFFECTS OF NMTC AND LIHTC INVESTMENT ON LOCAL
SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITITIONS

4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter revealed important clues about the underlying links between
the different types of poor neighborhoods and the locational patterns of place-based
investment. It found that the neighborhood types that experienced the strongest and most
consistent socioeconomic improvement from 2000 to 2009-2013 also attracted higher
concentrations of investment through both NMTC and LIHTC. This lends support for the
assumption made in previous research on both programs that developers seek out
locations that they expect will improve over time.

The previous chapter also found that the neighborhood dimension describing the
degree of urbanization in a census tract in 2000 was correlated with subsequent NMTC
investment, LIHTC investment, and multiple indicators of neighborhood socioeconomic
change. No other neighborhood dimension or individual observed attribute was
consistently related with both types of place-based investment and also socioeconomic
change. This suggests that the urbanization dimension uncovered through principal
components analysis may serve as a close approximation of the latent construct of
“developer preferences.” The only caveat to this is that among the highly urbanized
neighborhood types identified, those that were only moderately distressed in 2000
received less investment through NMTC and LIHTC than those that had higher initial
levels of socioeconomic distress. Thus, while developers have the most direct influence
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on where NMTC- and LIHTC-subsidized projects are located, their preferences may be
moderated by program provisions that encourage development in areas with lower
income and higher poverty rates than the basic eligibility requirements dictate.

The current chapter investigates the effects of NMTC investment and LIHTC
investment on socioeconomic outcomes in distressed neighborhoods. The insights from
the previous chapter regarding the underlying processes driving NMTC and LIHTC site
selection are applied to the development of a quasiexperimental model that addresses a
methodological issue that has haunted previous evaluations: the potential for model
misspecification due to the unobserved preferences of developers for certain types of
poor places.

For both NMTC and LIHTC, it was found that the urbanization dimens ion was
the primary underlying driver of site selection. In an evaluation focused on either NMTC
or LIHTC, taking extra care to ensure the pretreatment similarity of treated and
comparison census tracts on this dimension, or at least on the observed attributes
associated with it, such as homeownership rates, proportion of single family housing,
population density, and home values, would go a long way to bolstering confidence in
estimates of program impact.

However, this same finding, that NMTC and LIHTC site selection appears to be
driven by the same underlying process, raises a new methodological question that has
never before been considered: given the parallels in the neighborhood attributes that
attract NMTC and LIHTC investment, does evaluating one program without controlling
for the presence of the other result in biased estimates of program impact?
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The similarities in NMTC and LIHTC investment patterns within and across
neighborhood types are not just superficial, given that the neighborhood clusters were
identified by their similarities across three complex unobserved neighborhood
dimensions. Thus, even if a reasonably good job is done of properly specifying site
selection in an evaluation of one program or the other, there remains the distinct
possibility that the group of treated tracts were more likely than the comparison group to
have been targeted by the program that is not the focus of the evaluation.

Omitting an important explanatory variable from a model is a concern regardless
of the direction in which estimates are biased. However, the issue takes on an interesting
twist in the current study, considering the controversy surrounding LIHTC’s place-based
provisions, which provide developers with additional incentives to locate affordable
housing development specifically in places that are already disproportionately poor. As a
consequence, there is evidence that at least in some neighborhood contexts, LIHTCsubsidized development exacerbates existing patterns of concentrated poverty or
otherwise has a negative impact on indicators neighborhood socioeconomic well-being.
In contrast, there is little debate that the worst-case scenario for NMTC would be a
finding that it is a non-factor in efforts to revitalize distressed neighborhoods.

Assuming for the moment that the overall effect of LIHTC-subsidized housing
development in poor neighborhoods is to push the socioeconomic trajectory of targeted
areas downward, then an omitted LIHTC variable in an evaluation focused on NMTC
would effectively cancel out some of the true positive socioeconomic gains attributable to
NMTC. In an evaluation focused on LIHTC, the unaccounted-for revitalizing effects of
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NMTC development would similarly mask some of the poverty-concentrating effects of
LIHTC.

The current chapter proposes an evaluation approach that embraces the unique
relationship between NMTC and LIHTC. The insights gained from the previous chapter
regarding the underlying neighborhood factors that drive both NMTC and LIHTC site
selection are applied to several counterfactual models that attempt to estimate the
socioeconomic changes a distressed census tract would have experienced from 2000 to
2009-2013 if it had received no place-based investment, or if it had received some
combination of NMTC/LIHTC investment other than the treatment combination that it
did receive. In total, NMTC and LIHTC treatment effects are examined through the six
models shown in 17, along with the predicted differences in outcomes for each set of
treatment and comparison census tracts.

Table 17. Treatment-comparison models and predicted effect of treatment

Model Treatment
1
NMTC and LIHTC
2
NMTC and LIHTC
3
NMTC and LIHTC
4
NMTC only
5
NMTC only
6
LIHTC only

Comparison
NMTC only
LIHTC only
Neither
LIHTC only
Neither
Neither

Treatment effect
+
No difference
+
+
-

While questions remain as to whether LIHTC-subsidized housing development
helps or hurts low-income communities, the hypotheses continue with the assumption
that the poverty-concentrating effects of LIHTC outweigh its potential to revitalize
distressed areas. Thus, model 1 predicts that a census tract that received only NMTC
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investment would have experienced worse socioeconomic outcomes if it had instead
received both NMTC and LIHTC investment. Model 2 predicts that the injection of
NMTC investment into a census tract that only received LIHTC would have the opposite
effect, producing improved socioeconomic outcomes. Model 3 predicts that the positive
externalities generated by NMTC investment are effectively cancelled out by the poverty
concentrating effects of LIHTC. Thus, a census tract that received no form of place-based
treatment would have experienced the same socioeconomic outcomes if it had instead
been targeted by both NMTC and LIHTC. Model 4 predicts that if a census tract that
received LIHTC investment had instead received NMTC investment, it would have
experienced better socioeconomic outcomes. Models 5 and 6 represent the typical
evaluation design that estimates the treatment effects of a single program against the
counterfactual of no treatment. When compared to low-income census tracts not targeted
by either program, model 5 predicts that NMTC investment improves socioeconomic
outcomes, while model 6 predicts that LIHTC continues to demonstrate a negative impact
on indicators of socioeconomic well-being.

4.2 Methods
4.2.1 Define Program Treatment
In the previous chapter, program treatment was defined in binary terms, requiring
only that some nonzero amount of investment had been received. That simple
operationalization was sufficient, as the primary concern was with the locations of
NMTC- and LIHTC-subsidized projects. In the current chapter, the goal is to estimate the
socioeconomic effects of those investments. Recognizing that bigger investments would
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generally be expected to yield more significant local changes, a more comprehensive
operational definition of program treatment was needed to accomplish the goals of this
evaluation.

Research on a different place-based program, the Community Development Block
Grant (CDBG) program, offers some insight for defining program treatment. Galster and
colleagues (Galster, Tatian, & Accordino, 2006; Galster, Walker, Hayes, Boxall, &
Johnson, 2004) found that CDBG spending in a census tract above the mean level of
spending for all census tracts in the same metropolitan area represented an important
threshold of investment, above which significant improvements in neighborhood
conditions were realized. Unfortunately, there were quite a few metropolitan areas in the
current study in which only one or two census tracts received NMTC or LIHTC
investment. In these cases, the mean level of metropolitan spending obviously cannot
serve as a meaningful investment threshold. Still, I thought it important to impose some
minimum program treatment threshold. Because the literature on NMTC and LIHTC
provides no relevant guidance, a relatively lenient figure of $100,000 was selected for
this purpose. There were 91 census tracts that from 2003 to 2007 received nonzero
amounts of NMTC or LIHTC investment less than $100,000. They were eliminated from
further analysis.

Of the 14,659 census tracts that remained, 2,332, or approximately 16 percent,
received some form of place-based investment between 2003 and 2007. There were 734
that received NMTC investment and 1,764 that received LIHTC. While most census
tracts were targeted by only one program or the other, 166 were targeted by both NMTC
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and LIHTC. This small, yet not insignificant subset of distressed census tracts that
received investment through both programs suggests the delineation of three distinct
categories of place-based treatment, as it was possible for a census tract to have been
targeted by (a) NMTC alone, (b) LIHTC alone, or (c) by both NMTC and LIHTC.

4.2.2 Generate Propensity Scores
Propensity score matching (PSM) is an approach for making causal claims in
observational studies when random assignment into treatment and control groups is not
possible. It is a multi-step process that begins with the assignment of a “propensity score”
to all observations in a data set. In general, the propensity score is calculated by
regressing a dummy treatment variable onto a set of pretreatment attributes using logistic
regression or another model appropriate for dichotomous dependent variables. The fitted
value for each observation is interpreted as its predicted probability of receiving the
treatment given its pretreatment characteristics. This value, which ranges from 0 to 1, is
its propensity score.
The propensity score of each treated observation is then compared to the
propensity scores from a pool of untreated observations. The goal of the matching
procedure is, for each treated observation, to identify one or more corresponding
untreated observations with identical propensity scores. All untreated observations
without propensity scores identical to any of the treated observations are removed from
the comparison pool. Similarly, any treated observations for which there are no suitable
comparisons may also be excluded from analysis. What remains is a matched sample of
observations that had the same predicted probability of receiving the treatment given a set
of pretreatment characteristics. If all relevant pretreatment factors related to treatment
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selection were included in the matching procedure, and there were suitable comparison
observations to be found for most or all of the treated ones, the only relevant difference
between the treatment and comparison groups should be the treatment itself (Ho et al.,
2007).
Because there are multiple treatment conditions in this study, a modification of
the typical approach to PSM was necessary. Using methods developed and validated by
Lechner (2001, 2002) for simultaneously calculating the predicted probabilities that an
observation will receive each of multiple potential treatments, I coded a variable that
placed each census tract into one of four mutually exclusive treatment groups. Based on
the definition of program treatment described above, the variable reflected whether a
census tract received above-threshold levels of investment through (a) both NMTC and
LIHTC; (b) NMTC only; (c) LIHTC only; or (d) neither NMTC nor LIHTC. This
treatment combination variable, treat.combo, then served as the dependent variable in the
following multinomial logit regression:
treat.combo = mfi.ratio.00 + poverty.pct.00 + own.pct.00 + homes_multi_unit.pct.00 +
unemp.pct.00 + density.00.ratio + mhmval.00.ratio + black.pct.00 + other.race.00+
mhmval.90ch + urbanization
Where











mfi.ratio.00 = MFI ratio in 2000
poverty.pct.00 = poverty rate
own.pct.00 = percent of housing units that were owner-occupied
homes_multi_unit.pct.00 = percent of housing units located in multi-unit
structures
unemp.pct.00 = unemployment rate
density.00.ratio = population density in census tract / metropolitan area
mhmval.00.ratio = median home value in census tract / metropolitan area
black.pct.00 = percent black
other.race.00 = percent neither non-Hispanic black nor non-Hispanic white
mhmval.90ch = mhmval.00.ratio – mhmval.90.ratio
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urbanization = component score for urbanization dimension identified through
PCA
The validity of estimates generated through PSM depend on the specification of a

matching model that fully and properly accounts for “all variables that affect both the
treatment assignment and, controlling for the treatment, the dependent variable (Ho et al.,
2007).” If important variables are not included in the matching process, or if the matching
criteria are not sufficiently strict for key variables, then significant bias can be introduced
into the model, making it impossible to confidently attribute observed differences
between treated and untreated groups to the effects of the treatment (Ho et al., 2007). To
meet the requirements for causal validity, the matching model in the current study must
therefore include the neighborhood attributes of census tracts in 2000 that affected both
(a) its chances of being selected for NMTC and/or LIHTC during the 2000s, and (b) its
2000 to 2009-2013 socioeconomic trajectory.
Thus, the independent variables included in the regression equation were selected
to provide a well-rounded view of distressed census tracts eligible for NMTC and LIHTC
at a point in time shortly before treatment assignment occurred. Care was taken to include
variables that the findings from the previous chapter, as well as evidence from other
sources, suggest would have figured prominently in the decision-making process of
developers.
The only variables requiring any further explanation are perhaps urbanization and
mhmval.90ch. The variable urbanization is an index of the urbanization dimension
identified by PCA in the previous chapter (the composition of this index is shown in
Table 3 under the column TC2). It was found to be closely related to patterns of both
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NMTC/LIHTC investment and neighborhood socioeconomic change. Consequently, the
weighted combination of pretreatment neighborhood attributes contained within this
index were determined to bear close resemblance to the latent construct of “developer
preferences,” which previous studies have identified as an important, yet unobserved
driver of treatment selection. Though the observed variables that this index most strongly
relates to are also included in the model in their original uncombined forms, there is a
potential benefit to including them in their combined form as well, as Jakubowski (2014)
finds that matching observations on latent variables may yield estimates with smaller
standard errors.
The variable mhmval.90ch represents the change in rank in the median home
value of a census tract from 1990 to 2000, within its metropolitan area. Thus, census
tracts with values greater than 1 on this variable experienced housing appreciation that
outpaced the metropolitan area average in the decade leading up to the study baseline.
Baum-Snow and Marion (2009) used a similar variable to represent recent gentrification
in an evaluation of LIHTC, and found that it related to both the locations and effects of
future LIHTC investment. Furthermore, all the other independent variables describe the
static attributes of census tracts in 2000. Given that neighborhoods are constantly
changing and evolving, it was important to include at least one dynamic measure to
represent a census tract’s recent history and socioeconomic trajectory as of 2000.
Instead of a single propensity score, four separate propensity scores were
generated to represent the predicted probabilities of receiving each of the treatment
combinations. Table 18 summarizes the predicted probabilities for each of the four
treatment categories.
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Table 18. Predicted Probabilities of Receiving each Treatment (%)

Treatment
NMTC and LIHTC
NMTC only
LIHTC only
Neither

Mean
1.13
3.87
10.90
84.09

Minimum
0.00
0.02
0.42
31.93

Maximum
25.09
24.47
43.64
99.55

4.2.3 Match Treatment-Comparison Subsets
The matching procedure was performed using the R package Matching. First, the
data was split into six subsets of census tracts, corresponding to the treatment and
comparison groups outlined in Table 20. The following steps were performed on each
subset of the data.
For each census tract in the treatment group, the pool of potential matches was
restricted to those comparison tracts that were classified into the same neighborhood type
in Chapter 3. One-to-one matching was used, meaning that each treated census tract was
paired with the census tract from the comparison pool with smallest difference in
propensity score. Census tracts were only considered matches if their propensity scores
were within .25 standard deviations of each other. Thus, all census tracts from the
treatment group that could not be matched with a sufficiently similar comparison tract
were discarded.
What results is a dataset containing an equal number of treated and comparison
observations. If the matching procedure was successful, the pretreatment characteristics
of the treatment and comparison groups should be indistinguishable. There is no single
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metric or rule for determining if a matched dataset is sufficiently balanced. Rather, the
user should employ multiple diagnostic tools to make that judgement (Ho et al., 2007).
The appendix provides the differences in the mean values of each treatment-comparison
group before and after the matching procedure was performed.
4.2.4 Estimate Treatment Effects
The final step was to estimate the effects receiving one combination of
NMTC/LIHTC treatment, relative to either a different NMTC/LIHTC treatment
combination or no treatment. Difference- in-difference estimates were obtained for the six
counterfactual models on four socioeconomic outcomes: 2000 to 2009-2013 change in (a)
log of median family income, (b) unemployment, (d) poverty, and (e) log of median
home value. The DD estimates for the counterfactual models were obtained through the
following equations:
Model 1: NMTC and LIHTC versus NMTC alone:
Y = β0 + β1 both_dum + β2 NMTC_amt + β3 controls + β4 black10 + β5 County + ε
Model 2: NMTC and LIHTC versus LIHTC alone:
Y = β0 + β1 both_dum + β2 LIHTC_amt + β3 controls + β4 black10 + β5 County + ε
Model 3: NMTC and LIHTC versus neither:
Y = β0 + β1 both_dum + β2 controls + β3 black10 + β4 County + ε
Model 4: NMTC only versus LIHTC only:
Y = β0 + β1 NMTC_dum + β2 controls + β3 black10+ β4 County + ε
Model 5: NMTC only versus neither
Y = β0 + β1 NMTC_dum + β2 controls + β3 black10 + β4 County + ε
Model 6: LIHTC only versus neither:
Y = β0 + β1 LIHTC_dum + β2 controls + β3 black10 +β4 County + ε,
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Where Y represents the four socioeconomic outcomes listed above, and the variables
both_dum, NMTC_dum, and LIHTC_dum are dummy variables coded to one if a census
tract received the treatment condition, and zero if it received the comparison condition.
Thus, the models estimate the effects of receiving some above-threshold (>$100,000)
amount of investment through both programs (Models 1-3), NMTC (Model 4 & 5), or
LIHTC (Model 6), relative to the comparison condition.
The makeup of the comparison groups in models 1 and 2 necessitated the
inclusion of the variables NMTC_amt and LIHTC_amt to account for the dollar amount
of investment received by the comparison group through NMTC (model 1) and LIHTC
(model 2). In model 1, both the treatment and comparison groups received investment
through NMTC. In model 2, both groups received LIHTC. Ideally, I would have matched
the census tracts in the treatment group to comparison census tracts that received similar
amounts of investment through NMTC (model 1) or LIHTC (model 2). Unfortunately,
investment amounts for both programs varied widely from tract to tract, and were
uncorrelated with the other pretreatment attributes used to calculate the propensity scores.
As a result, attempts to include measures of NMTC and LIHTC investment amounts in
the matching procedures threw off the balance between the treatment and comparison
groups on other important pretreatment variables. Thus, it was necessary to control for
differences in investment intensity at this stage. If NMTC_amt and LIHTC_amt were not
included in the equations for models 1 and 2, then observed differences in the outcomes
of the treatment and comparison groups might be explained more by large differences in
the amount of investment received by the treatment and comparison groups through the
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program that both groups received than by the addition of investment through the
program that only the treatment group received.
The variable controls includes the eleven variables listed earlier used to obtain the
propensity scores. Because it is rarely the case that propensity scores produce exact
matches for all observations on all relevant variables, including these variables in the
final regression equations accounts for any remaining differences between the treatment
and comparison observations. Two additional control variables were included, black10
and County.
First, black10 is the percentage point change in the black population from 2000 to
2009-2013. Recent research demonstrates that the process of neighborhood
socioeconomic ascent may occur through one or more of several distinct pathways
(Owens, 2012; Van Criekingen & Decroly, 2003). In the context of concentrated poverty,
the most well-known of these pathways is the classic gentrification process in which
ascent occurs through the displacement of the traditional, often minority residents of a
distressed neighborhood by wealthier, and typically white newcomers. Given that one of
the criticisms of place-based investment is that resources are often siphoned off by
unintended beneficiaries before they are able to reach the intended beneficiaries (Crane &
Manville, 2008; Glaeser & Gottlieb, 2008; Gurley-Calvez et al., 2009)- i.e., the current
residents of targeted areas, it is important to distinguish between different pathways of
ascent. The purpose of the variable black10 is to control for improved socioeconomic
conditions in poor neighborhoods resulting from the displacement of current residents.
Second, the factor variable County controls for county fixed effects. A
neighborhood’s socioeconomic trajectory is a function of the changes it experiences
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directly, such as those that result from NMTC or LIHTC investment, as well as the social,
political, geographic, and economic realities of the surrounding area (Galster, 2001).
Thus, it was important to control for potentially vast regional differences that are
consequential for socioeconomic outcomes.
4.3 Results
The quality of the matches in the six counterfactual models was assessed using
the best practices suggested by Ho, Imai, and King (Ho et al., 2007); adjustments were
made to the specification of the matching model until a combination of variables was
identified that produced good balance on key pretreatment variables for all six treatmentcomparison groups. The tables in the appendix provide descriptive statistics for the
counterfactual models before and after matching. T-tests were also performed to establish
that the differences between the matched treatment and comparison groups were
insignificant. In this respect, the matching procedure was unable to remove all significant
differences on all variables in some of the models; however, these remaining differences
were for the most part inconsequential in a practical sense. For example, before
conducting the matching procedure for counterfactual model 1 (treatment: both NMTC
and LIHTC; comparison: NMTC only), the mean poverty rates of the treatment and
comparison groups were 30.5 percent and 25.3 percent, respectively. Though the
matching procedure eliminated more than half of the original distance between the groups
(new mean poverty rates of 27.2 percent for treatment group and 25.1 percent for
comparison group), the t-test still indicated that the two groups were significantly
different on this important pretreatment attribute. However, there is little substantive
difference between a census tract with a poverty rate of 27.2 percent and one with a
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poverty rate of 25.1, in terms of either NMTC or LIHTC provisions, developer
preferences, likely socioeconomic trajectory, or the ability of an observer to detect the
differences. Furthermore, the inclusion of year 2000 poverty rate in the final regression
equation cancels out this remaining imbalance. The empirical results are presented from
Table 19 to Table 24.

Table 19 estimates the differences in socioeconomic outcomes between census
tracts that received only NMTC investment and those that received the same amount of
NMTC investment plus some above-threshold (>$100,000) amount of LIHTC
investment. It finds that the addition of LIHTC-subsidized housing had no significant
impact in either direction on the socioeconomic outcomes of census tracts that were
targeted by NMTC alone.

However, the significant NMTC spending coefficient on the equation looking at
2000 to 2009-2013 unemployment change indicates that every $100,000 of NMTC
investment reduced unemployment change by .006 percentage points, regardless of
whether LIHTC was received. On average, unemployment rose in this sample by 2.01
percent. Given that the average NMTC investment amount was $9.5 million,
unemployment would have risen by an additional .57 percentage points (.006 * 95) over
the course of the 2000s were it not for NMTC spillovers.

Table 19. Treatment Effects Both vs. NMTC
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Dependent variable:
MFI

Poverty Unemployment Home Values

Treatment:NMTC and LIHTC 0.040 -0.352
(0.045) (1.316)

0.436
(0.827)

-0.006
(0.046)

NMTC (per $100,000)

0.0001 -0.001
(0.0001) (0.003)

-0.006**
(0.002)

0.0001
(0.0001)

Constant

-0.743* 60.790***
(0.413) (12.149)

24.175***
(7.635)

-0.022
(0.423)

Observations
308
308
R2
0.666
0.707
2
Adjusted R
0.401
0.474
Residual Std. Error (df = 171) 0.261
7.683
***
F Statistic (df = 136; 171)
2.508
3.030***

308
0.808
0.655
4.828
5.282***

308
0.697
0.455
0.268
2.886***

Note:

* p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<0.01

Table 20 estimates the differences in socioeconomic outcomes for census tracts
that received only LIHTC investment and those that received the same amount of LIHTC
investment plus some above-threshold level of NMTC investment. It finds that the
injection of NMTC-subsidized development yielded improved outcomes in poverty rate
change. This finding supports the hypothesis that NMTC-subsidized development
improves socioeconomic outcomes in distressed neighborhoods. On the other hand, it
does not necessarily say anything about the effects of LIHTC investment. After
controlling for NMTC investment and other relevant neighborhood factors, increasing
amounts of LIHTC spending had no significant influence on census tract socioeconomic
change in this sample.
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Table 20. Treatment Effects Both vs. LIHTC
Dependent variable:
MFI

Poverty Unemployment Home Values

Treatment:NMTC and LIHTC 0.040 -3.824***
(0.043) (1.132)

-0.586
(0.807)

0.040
(0.051)

LIHTC (per $100,000)

0.0001 -0.033
(0.002) (0.057)

0.035
(0.041)

-0.001
(0.003)

Constant

-0.225 37.689***
(0.298) (7.795)

25.080***
(5.556)

0.471
(0.351)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 170)
F Statistic (df = 145; 170)

316
0.690
0.425
0.273
2.606***

316
0.783
0.598
5.096
4.235***

316
0.633
0.321
0.322
2.025***

316
0.698
0.440
7.149
2.707***

* p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<0.01

Note:

Table 21 estimates the differences in outcomes for census tracts that received
above-threshold amounts of investment through both NMTC and LIHTC, compared to
otherwise comparable census tracts that were not targeted by either program. In this
scenario, it was found that being targeted by both programs had a positive impact on both
income and poverty outcomes. While my original prediction was that the revitalizing
effects of NMTC investment would be canceled out by the poverty concentrating effects
of LIHTC investment, it may instead be the case that NMTC and LIHTC together created
a critical mass of new investment that catalyzed the revitalization process. Another
possibility is that because the average amount of NMTC investment received by the
treatment group was considerably higher than LIHTC (NMTC: $11.1 million; LIHTC:
$955,000), the positive effects of NMTC outweighed any negative effects of LIHTC
investment.
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Table 21. Treatment Effects Both vs. Neither
Dependent variable:
MFI

Poverty

Unemployment Home Values

Treatment:NMTC and LIHTC 0.113* -3.745** -0.852
(0.059) (1.655) (0.883)

0.005
(0.054)

Constant

-1.186** 57.797*** 33.974***
(0.474) (13.203) (7.041)

0.921**
(0.428)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 170)
F Statistic (df = 155; 170)

326
326
0.627 0.599
0.286 0.234
0.328 9.140
1.840*** 1.642***

326
0.675
0.378
0.297
2.276***

326
0.813
0.643
4.874
4.771***

* p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<0.01

Note:

Table 22 considers what would have happened if a census tract that received
above-threshold LIHTC investment had instead receive above-threshold NMTC
investment. This counterfactual finds that replacing LIHTC with NMTC had significant
benefits for both income and home value change.

Table 22. Treatment Effects NMTC vs. LIHTC
Dependent variable:
MFI

Poverty Unemployment Home Values

Treatment: NMTC Only

0.075*** -0.087
(0.024) (0.701)

-0.508
(0.479)

0.049**
(0.024)

Constant

-0.506** 51.144***
(0.216) (6.395)

20.601***
(4.368)

0.245
(0.217)
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Observations
1,104
2
R
0.491
2
Adjusted R
0.284
Residual Std. Error (df = 784) 0.279
F Statistic (df = 319; 784)
2.373***

1,104
0.539
0.351
8.282
2.869***

1,104
0.687
0.559
5.657
5.388***

1,104
0.560
0.381
0.282
3.126***

* p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<0.01

Note:

Table 23 and Table 24 show the effects of receiving above-threshold amounts of
NMTC and LIHTC investment, respectively, relative to the counterfactual condition of
receiving no investment through either program. Table 23 finds that home values rose
more in census tracts that received NMTC, while Table 24 finds that LIHTC investment
was responsible for weaker income growth and a sharper increase in poverty.

Table 23. Treatment Effects NMTC vs. Neither
Dependent variable:
MFI

Poverty

Unemployment Home Values

Treatment:NMTC Only

-0.007 0.075
(0.022) (0.688)

Constant

-0.376 46.529*** 28.485***
(0.246) (7.531) (4.629)

Observations
1,128 1,128
2
R
0.464 0.453
Adjusted R2
0.255 0.241
Residual Std. Error (df = 811) 0.286 8.752
F Statistic (df = 316; 811)
2.219*** 2.129***

-0.544
(0.423)

1,128
0.649
0.513
5.380
4.751***

0.050**
(0.021)
0.225
(0.234)
1,128
0.577
0.412
0.272
3.499***

* p<0.1, ** p<.05, *** p<0.01

Note:
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Table 24. Treatment Effects LIHTC vs. Neither
Dependent variable:
MFI

Poverty Unemployment Home Values

Treatment:LIHTC Only

-0.022** 0.643*
(0.010) (0.350)

Constant

-0.067 39.343***
(0.195) (6.523)

Observations
3,192
2
R
0.395
Adjusted R2
0.282
Residual Std. Error (df = 2690) 0.253
F Statistic (df = 501; 2690)
3.500***

3,192
0.436
0.331
8.469
4.152***

0.027
(0.257)

0.004
(0.011)

21.766***
(4.799)

0.258
(0.196)

3,192
0.549
0.465
6.230
6.532***

3,192
0.546
0.461
0.255
6.448***
* p** p***p<0.01

Note:

4.4 Discussion
This chapter investigated the effects of being targeted by either NMTC or LIHTC
in census tracts that otherwise received investment through the other program or that
were targeted by neither NMTC nor LIHTC, on the socioeconomic trajectories of
distressed places.

In the only similar study on NMTC to date, Freedman (2012) found that NMTC
eligibility had modest positive impacts on income and poverty change. This study
supports those earlier findings, as in three of the four counterfactual scenarios where the
treatment involved the addition of NMTC investment into a census tract, change in the
desired direction was observed for one or both of these indicators. The current study is
also the first to find evidence of NMTC investment’s positive impacts on local home
values. Of the four indicators investigated, the only one for which NMTC was not found
to have any significant impact was change in the unemployment rate.
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The findings tell a more nuanced story about the socioeconomic effects of LIHTC
investment. In three of the models, the treatment involved LIHTC investment in a census
tract. In the scenario where LIHTC investment was an addition to NMTC investment
(Table 22), LIHTC was found to have no significant impact on socioeconomic change.
When LIHTC investment occurred in conjunction with NMTC investment in places that
were otherwise not targeted by either program, positive socioeconomic changes were
observed. When the counterfactual condition involved no place-based treatment, the
addition of LIHTC investment led to worse outcomes in terms of both income and
poverty. In other words, there were contexts in which the implications of LIHTC
investment in a poor neighborhood were negligible, positive, and negative.

122

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
5.1 Summary of Findings
This dissertation explored the various poverty contexts that place-based programs
like NMTC and LIHTC are tasked to address, identified the neighborhood attributes most
important for determining whether a distressed census tract is likely to be targeted for
place-based investment, and estimated the effects of those investments on local
socioeconomic conditions with the understanding that different sources of place-based
investment may gravitate towards the same kinds of distressed places.
Chapter 3 found that local levels of human capital and distress, urbanization, and
the degree to which the populations of poor neighborhoods are racially segregated are the
three neighborhood dimensions that are the main sources of variation among poor places.
The cluster analysis delineated distressed census tracts according to these dimensions and
revealed the existence of ten distinct and interpretable types of poor neighborhoods. The
neighborhood types with the highest concentrations of census tracts that received NMTC
and LIHTC investment were those that experienced the best socioeconomic outcomes
during the 2000s. This finding supports the assumptions made in previous research on
both programs that developers seek out distressed places that are well-positioned to
experience socioeconomic ascent.
A census tract’s initial level of urbanization was strongly associated both with
subsequent socioeconomic change and subsequent place-based investment through
NMTC and LIHTC. No other observed attribute or dimension was related to these
processes. Therefore, urbanization, which in this study refers to a combination of
123

population, housing, and proximity features, including low levels of homeownership, a
high proportion of housing in apartments and other multi-unit structures, low relative
income, high relative home values values, and high relative population density, is likely
to be closely related to the latent construct of “developer preferences,” and thus an
important determinant of treatment selection.
With a deeper understanding of the unobserved treatment selection processes that
steer NMTC and LIHTC into similar types of distressed places, Chapter 4 estimated the
effects of investments made through these programs in their shared space. Six
counterfactual models were examined, each of which examined the effects of adding
either NMTC or LIHTC investment into a census tract that received the other program or
that was not targeted by either program. In every case where the treatment involved the
addition of NMTC investment in a census tract, there was evidence of socioeconomic
gains on at least one indicator. In contrast, increased poverty and lower income were
observed when LIHTC investment was the treatment. The only exception to this was the
model that compared the effects of receiving both NMTC and LIHTC treatment to no
treatment through either program. In this case, being targeted by both programs had
significant benefits in terms of both poverty and income change.
5.2 Limitations of Study
This research ran up against two main limitations, both related to the data used to
represent neighborhoods. Neighborhood is a complex, multifaceted concept, and there
was simply no way to build neighborhood profiles using available tract-level data that
incorporated every important aspect of a neighborhood’s being. Because this study
looked at areas of socioeconomic distress in metropolitan areas throughout the US, I was
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limited to using universally available census tract data. While Galster (Galster, 2001)
identifies at least ten distinct types of neighborhood attributes, I conceptualized
neighborhoods around the four attribute types for which suitable indicators were readily
available- demographic, class status, housing, and relative location/proximity
characteristics. However, these sorts of data limitations are all but unavoidable in
neighborhood research, particularly in a geographically expansive study such as this.
Still, dozens of tract-level variables are available through the census, and it is
possible to construct dozens more through various combinations and permutations.
Despite the availability of many more variables for describing neighborhood attributes, I
selected 13 neighborhood variables for inclusion in the PCA. By comparison, using the
same two-step approach to develop a typology of inner-ring suburban census tracts,
Hanlon (Hanlon, 2009) entered 44 variables into PCA to uncover neighborhood
dimensions. However, I found that PCA was most successful at producing coherent
neighborhood dimensions with a limited set of theoretically relevant indicators. After
dozens of iterations, I found that the 13 variables included in the PCA struck a strong
balance between comprehensiveness and coherence.
On the other hand, there is certainly room to argue that I left some key pieces of
information relevant for understanding neighborhood socioeconomic trajectories on the
table. Specifically, the included variables are all static indicators of a census tract’s
characteristics at a specific point in time. I did not include any dynamic variables
representing the recent history and trajectory leading up to the start of the study period in
2000. This is a legitimate concern because neighborhood typologies often incorporate
dynamic measures, and several recent typologies have focused on the evolution of
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neighborhood structure and the pathways of socioeconomic ascent over the course of
decades (Delmelle, 2015, 2017; Owens, 2012).
I originally intended to include 1990-2000 change in home value as one of the
variables for identifying neighborhood dimensions, as previous research suggests that the
direction in which LIHTC pushes socioeconomic outcomes may depend on whether a
census tract was ascending, stable, or declining at the time of the investment (BaumSnow & Marion, 2009). However, this change variable was not sufficiently correlated
with any of the static year 2000 variables. As a result, when it was included in the PCA it
tended to load highly on a component by itself, muddying its interpretation and limiting
its usefulness as a meaningful neighborhood dimension. When that failed, I tried to
instead include it in the cluster analysis, alongside with the three meaningful dimensions
that were identified. Again, its inclusion made the interpretation of distinct and
meaningful neighborhood types difficult. Thus, I settled for using it as one of the
matching variables in the second empirical chapter. In the end, the set of static variables
for this study produced interpretable and theory-backed neighborhood dimensions and
neighborhood types. Furthermore, ensuring that treated and comparison tracts had similar
trajectories leading up to the treatment selection period is the most important use of this
dynamic variable for the goals of this study.
5.3 Policy Implications
Understanding how place-based resources are distributed among eligible areas is
important for several reasons. Concentrated poverty has increased since 2000, and more
than 70 million people now live in a census tract in which at least 20 percent of their
neighbors are poor (P. A. Jargowsky, 2013). Unfortunately, the resources available for
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addressing this widespread problem are limited, so it is critical that programs like NMTC
and LIHTC target places where they can have the biggest possible impact on local
conditions. This raises the fundamental question of whether priority should be on
moderately distressed places that are well-positioned to leverage NMTC- or LIHTCinvestment as a catalyst for sustained private investment and revitalization or on places
struggling with extreme levels of socioeconomic distress with the greatest overall need
for a variety of sustained policy interventions. This research supports the unsurprising
argument that the market actors that utilize these programs prioritize the former.
However, the relatively low levels of NMTC and LIHTC investment in high-density
neighborhood types that were only moderately distressed suggests that both programs
have in place effective combinations of incentives and disincentives for moderating the
motivation for developers to seek out the most stable and urbanized eligible locations,
and make investments into a much wider range of distressed places.
From an evaluation perspective, the deep parallels in the treatment selection
processes guiding NMTC and LIHTC suggests the need for more integrated and nuanced
assessments of these types of programs. This study did not provide a conclusive answer
to the question of whether LIHTC investment into poor neighborhoods improves local
conditions or mainly serves to reinforce existing patterns of concentrated poverty.
However, it did find that the addition of LIHTC activity in a census tract generally had a
modest negative impact on indicators used to judge the effectiveness of these sorts of
programs. Thus, the revitalizing effects of NMTC and the poverty-concentrating effects
of LIHTC are likely to cancel each other out, at least partially, unless explicit steps are
taken to account for their underlying similarities.
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However, NMTC and LIHTC are just the tip of the place-based iceberg. There are
many other federal, state, and local programs that, just like NMTC and LIHTC, harness
market forces to address the market failures that have left many distressed places
chronically cut off from critical financial resources. Thus, controlling for the presence of
LIHTC activity when estimating the effects of NMTC investment, and vice versa, is a
first step towards research designs that better consider the underlying neighborhood
factors that are likely to attract place-based investment from multiple sources beyond
these two programs.
Recognizing the difficulty of fully representing the complicated policy
environment in poor neighborhoods, a more nuanced take on the concept of success is
also warranted. For all their similarities, NMTC and LIHTC address different problems.
It may not be reasonable to expect that the economic and community development focus
of NMTC would produce the same kinds of neighborhood changes as LIHTC, which
addresses the undersupply of quality affordable housing options for poor residents, even
if both programs are functioning as intended. Therefore, the socioeconomic change
variables used in this and similar studies as indicators of program impact should be
interpreted with the understanding that defining success in the context of a problem as
complex and multifaceted as neighborhood poverty involves several considerations, not
all of which are easy to measure.
5.4 Directions for Future Research
The research carried out in this dissertation provides numerous jumping off points
for further exploring the various contexts of neighborhood poverty, the problems arising
in these areas that place-based programs like NMTC and LIHTC are intended to address,
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the relationships between different sources of place-based investment, and methods for
evaluating place-based programs that integrate multiple investment sources into a single
analytical framework. Perhaps the most natural first step forward from here would be to
reconsider the questions driving this research in the various poverty contexts this study
revealed. For instance, within each neighborhood type, does it still hold true that the
urbanization dimension is the common thread that explains NMTC investment, LIHTC
investment, and socioeconomic ascent? Or are there other neighborhood attributes or
dimensions that are better at explaining these processes in some neighborhood types?
Along the same lines, are there variations in the effects of NMTC and LIHTC investment
across neighborhood types? Are there some poverty contexts in which the revitalizing
forces of LIHTC-subsidized development outweigh the poverty-concentrating forces?
Similarly, are the socioeconomic benefits of NMTC investment relatively evenly
distributed across neighborhood types, or are they concentrated within just a few select
types of poor census tracts?
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APPENDIX
Comparison of Group Means Before and After Matching: NMTC and LIHTC
Investment Versus NMTC Investment Alone
Before Matching
After Matching
Both
NMTC
Both
NMTC
Variable Name
n
172
568
160
160
Income
$39,635
$40,944
$39,558
$39,534
Tract/Metro Income
52.22
55.49
51.99
52.69
Poverty Rate
30.14
28.39
30.16
31.20
Unemployment Rate
12.77
11.96
12.78
12.54
Pct. Females in Labor Force
50.64
52.58
50.50
51.43
Pct. White
35.10
36.68
33.81
39.02
Pct. Black
27.78
32.11
27.35
24.15
Pct. Hispanic
28.64
24.75
30.10
28.92
Pct. Asian
6.35
4.27
6.59
5.53
Pct. Foreign born
20.69
17.91
21.57
21.62
Pct. H.S. Diploma or Less
61.77
63.97
62.70
64.70
Pct. Bachelors or More
14.79
13.57
14.11
14.45
Pct. Households Female-headed
26.66
26.36
26.82
25.69
Tract/Metro Pop. Density
143
152
147
155
Pct. Housing Owner-occupied
29.43
35.61
30.49
30.05
Pct. Housing Multi-unit
62.87
54.29
61.40
60.81
Pct. Housing Vacant
9.91
10.50
9.57
8.94
Tract/Metro Median Home
Value
73.41
66.51
68.07
65.18
Urbanization Index Score
0.59
0.28
0.54
0.52
Tract/Metro Median Home
Value
0.73
0.67
0.68
0.65
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Comparison of Group Means Before and After Matching: NMTC and LIHTC
Investment Versus LIHTC Investment Alone
Before Matching
After Matching
Both
LIHTC
Both
LIHTC
Variable Name
n
172
1662
163
163
Income
$39,635
$40,210
$39,595
$39,137
Tract/Metro Income
52.22
55.32
52.12
51.34
Poverty Rate
30.14
29.16
29.91
30.11
Unemployment Rate
12.77
12.59
12.68
12.99
Pct. Females in Labor Force
50.64
51.44
50.60
51.36
Pct. White
35.10
30.37
34.65
31.75
Pct. Black
27.78
36.97
27.41
28.99
Pct. Hispanic
28.64
26.51
29.33
31.88
Pct. Asian
6.35
4.66
6.44
5.71
Pct. Foreign born
20.69
18.77
21.16
22.89
Pct. H.S. Diploma or Less
61.77
64.90
62.39
64.52
Pct. Bachelors or More
14.79
11.97
14.42
12.67
Pct. Households Female-headed
26.66
28.07
26.61
28.64
Tract/Metro Pop. Density
143
168
145
167
Pct. Housing Owner-occupied
29.43
37.80
30.47
28.29
Pct. Housing Multi-unit
62.87
50.06
61.51
62.38
Pct. Housing Vacant
9.91
9.80
9.88
9.10
Tract/Metro Median Home
Value
73.41
64.44
68.42
68.51
Urbanization Index Score
0.59
0.23
0.53
0.63
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Comparison of Group Means Before and After Matching: NMTC and LIHTC
Investment Versus No Treatment
Before Matching
After Matching
Both
Neither
Both
Neither
Variable Name
n
172
12327
169
169
Income
$39,635
$43,742
$39,618
$38,828
Tract/Metro Income
52.22
60.44
52.22
51.05
Poverty Rate
30.14
25.24
30.24
31.80
Unemployment Rate
12.77
10.61
12.70
12.95
Pct. Females in Labor Force
50.64
52.62
50.67
52.68
Pct. White
35.10
36.43
34.65
35.15
Pct. Black
27.78
30.70
27.71
25.88
Pct. Hispanic
28.64
26.77
29.08
31.29
Pct. Asian
6.35
4.34
6.41
5.90
Pct. Foreign born
20.69
19.40
20.95
24.49
Pct. H.S. Diploma or Less
61.77
63.64
62.05
63.74
Pct. Bachelors or More
14.79
13.15
14.60
14.49
Pct. Households Female-headed
26.66
23.64
26.69
26.33
Tract/Metro Pop. Density
143
166
143
152
Pct. Housing Owner-occupied
29.43
45.25
29.79
30.25
Pct. Housing Multi-unit
62.87
43.67
62.31
62.54
Pct. Housing Vacant
9.91
9.25
9.91
8.95
Tract/Metro Median Home
Value
0.73
0.66
0.72
0.70
Urbanization Index Score
0.59
-0.07
0.57
0.61
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Comparison of Group Means Before and After Matching: NMTC Investment Versus
LIHTC Investment
Before Matching
After Matching
NMTC
LIHTC
NMTC
LIHTC
Variable Name
n
568
1662
552
552
Income
$40,944
$40,210
$40,817
$39,233
Tract/Metro Income
55.49
55.32
55.30
54.33
Poverty Rate
28.39
29.16
28.34
30.10
Unemployment Rate
11.96
12.59
11.92
12.75
Pct. Females in Labor Force
52.58
51.44
52.58
50.60
Pct. White
36.68
30.37
36.03
33.13
Pct. Black
32.11
36.97
32.38
35.40
Pct. Hispanic
24.75
26.51
25.12
25.39
Pct. Asian
4.27
4.66
4.31
4.67
Pct. Foreign born
17.91
18.77
18.12
19.00
Pct. H.S. Diploma or Less
63.97
64.90
64.12
64.77
Pct. Bachelors or More
13.57
11.97
13.47
12.43
Pct. Households Female-headed
26.36
28.07
26.50
28.17
Tract/Metro Pop. Density
152
168
154
161
Pct. Housing Owner-occupied
35.61
37.80
36.01
34.76
Pct. Housing Multi-unit
54.29
50.06
53.75
53.94
Pct. Housing Vacant
10.50
9.80
10.41
10.06
Tract/Metro Median Home
Value
0.67
0.64
0.65
0.66
Urbanization Index Score
0.28
0.23
0.26
0.33
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Comparison of Group Means Before and After Matching: NMTC Investment Versus No
Treatment
Before Matching
After Matching
NMTC
Neither
NMTC
Neither
Variable Name
n
568
12327
564
564
Income
$40,944
$43,742
$40,830
$40,770
Tract/Metro Income
55.49
60.44
55.34
55.00
Poverty Rate
28.39
25.24
28.39
28.53
Unemployment Rate
11.96
10.61
11.94
11.87
Pct. Females in Labor Force
52.58
52.62
52.57
51.94
Pct. White
36.68
36.43
36.58
35.08
Pct. Black
32.11
30.70
32.18
33.14
Pct. Hispanic
24.75
26.77
24.79
25.73
Pct. Asian
4.27
4.34
4.27
4.36
Pct. Foreign born
17.91
19.40
17.93
19.68
Pct. H.S. Diploma or Less
63.97
63.64
64.01
63.38
Pct. Bachelors or More
13.57
13.15
13.53
13.69
Pct. Households Female-headed
26.36
23.64
26.46
26.64
Tract/Metro Pop. Density
152
166
153
156
Pct. Housing Owner-occupied
35.61
45.25
35.82
34.90
Pct. Housing Multi-unit
54.29
43.67
54.01
55.43
Pct. Housing Vacant
10.50
9.25
10.46
9.93
Tract/Metro Median Home
Value
0.67
0.66
0.66
0.66
Urbanization Index Score
0.28
-0.07
0.27
0.32
Tract/Metro Median Home
Value
0.02
-0.02
0.01
0.01
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Comparison of Group Means Before and After Matching: LIHTC Investment Versus No
Treatment
Before Matching
After Matching
LIHTC
Neither
LIHTC
Neither
Variable Name
n
1662
12327
1660
1660
Income
$40,210
$43,742
$40,221
$40,170
Tract/Metro Income
55.32
60.44
55.32
55.49
Poverty Rate
29.16
25.24
29.14
29.17
Unemployment Rate
12.59
10.61
12.59
12.39
Pct. Females in Labor Force
51.44
52.62
51.44
51.79
Pct. White
30.37
36.43
30.35
29.21
Pct. Black
36.97
30.70
37.01
37.10
Pct. Hispanic
26.51
26.77
26.53
28.04
Pct. Asian
4.66
4.34
4.63
4.12
Pct. Foreign born
18.77
19.40
18.76
19.16
Pct. H.S. Diploma or Less
64.90
63.64
64.92
65.16
Pct. Bachelors or More
11.97
13.15
11.96
12.13
Pct. Households Female-headed
28.07
23.64
28.06
27.51
Tract/Metro Pop. Density
168
166
168
167
Pct. Housing Owner-occupied
37.80
45.25
37.83
38.40
Pct. Housing Multi-unit
50.06
43.67
50.09
48.55
Pct. Housing Vacant
9.80
9.25
9.81
9.80
Tract/Metro Median Home
Value
0.64
0.66
0.64
0.64
Urbanization Index Score
0.23
-0.07
0.23
0.20
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